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legislation which gives everything to Canada, and nothing to the United States. Why can't we learn from the teachings of our distinguished colleague Senator WAYNE MORSE, of Oregon? We should realize by now that one-way deals with foreign countries cannot possibly win the gratitude or promote the political stability of those countries. As Mr. Flaherty points out, the average Canadian will only view this tariff deal in terms of a \$50 million loss in tariff revenues. He will still have to pay a high price for his automobile while the American automotive "giants" will accrue larger profits at Canadian expense. And how can Canada, a country with a chronic balance-of-payments problem, afford this added drain on their dollar reserves? I tell you we have had enough of these one-sided errors in our foreign aid policy.

And finally, how can our Government reconcile itself to the fact that it imposes strict "voluntary" restrictions on the flight of capital to foreign countries and then turns around and enacts legislation which encourages this flight. I am sure that I cannot reconcile it to myself.

[From the Miami (Fla.) Herald, Oct. 4, 1965]
WILL AUTO AGREEMENT WITH UNITED STATES
HURT PEARSON?

(By Frank Flaherty)

OTTAWA, ONTARIO.—Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson's election campaign is in trouble over \$50 million.

It has nothing to do with campaign funds. It is an estimate of the amount of duties collected by the Canadian Government in a year on imports of autos, trucks, and parts.

Under the Canada-United States auto free trade deal now before Congress, the Government won't get the \$50 million from here on.

Government opponents say this means a handout to the big American auto companies—General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, American Motors, and Studebaker—who make most of the cars and trucks sold in Canada.

Up to now they've been making parts and mostly standard model cars in Canada, selling them at somewhat higher prices than the same cars bring in the United States. Canadians who want fancy or luxury cars get them from American plants through the same dealers, also at higher prices because of Canada's 17½ percent tariff.

The auto tariff deal, signed last January, will establish limited free trade between the two countries on cars and parts. It will be limited because only auto manufacturers will be able to import cars or parts duty free. Any Canadian individual who orders a car from the United States must pay the duty.

So opponents of the Government are saying:

Canada will lose \$50 million. The Canadian car user still will pay a high price. The American car manufacturers will earn bigger profits from their Canadian operations.

The Government has counterarguments but is having trouble getting them across to the average voter. It predicts that Canadian car prices will work around to the American level in a few years, but it can't promise that. It can't promise cheaper cars because chances are prices in both countries will move up.

The general benefits it expects for the Canadian economy are more important than a saving of a few dollars on the price of a car.

The auto companies are parties to the agreement. They're committed to increase production, capital investment and employment in Canada. They're expected to manufacture a lot more cars and parts in Canadian plants than before and make them cheaper

because they'll have longer runs on fewer models.

The Government stands to gain in taxes more than it loses. More business will lift returns from income tax and corporation profits taxes.

The main reason for the Canada-United States auto trade deal on both sides escapes notice in the current Canadian political debate. It has not escaped notice in the debates in the Senate at Washington. There it is recognized that the United States is buying protection against Canadian restrictions on American trade.

Canada has a tough balance-of-payments problem, aggravated by the fact that Canadians pay out about \$70 million for imported cars and parts. Canada is the second biggest car market in the world. Countries that use fewer cars, such as Britain, France, and Germany, see that their own people use home-made cars. Canada could do the same.

The Canadian Government had to reduce its balance-of-payments deficit. It could have imposed restrictions, forcing Canadians to use more Canadian cars by higher tariffs or import quotas. This would have raised prices and restricted the range of choice of Canadian car users. It would also have closed out a big market for American cars and parts.

THE RIGHT TO SNEER—THE WAR ON POVERTY

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, recently I was privileged to read in the Argus-Champion, a weekly newspaper in Newport, N.H., an outstanding editorial entitled "The Right To Sneer."

This editorial is in support of the war on poverty and the Great Society. It points out the needs for these programs and asks for a better understanding of the accomplishments that we are trying to meet by these programs.

In conclusion the editorial asked those who would sneer at the problem of poverty either try to convince people that there is no such thing as poverty or to come forth with a better program.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this editorial printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Newport (N.H.) Argus-Champion, Sept. 23, 1965]

THE RIGHT TO SNEER

Some of our Granite State politicians and observers of the public scene have developed a knee-jerk reaction to the terms, "Great Society" and "War on Poverty." Whenever they use the terms up comes a conditioned reflex and they add, "whatever that is?"

This is a little sad. Some listeners—or readers—could interpret that reflex as evidence that the politician or observer really believes there is no such thing as poverty, or if there is, there is nothing that can be done about it.

Maybe the war on poverty will result in a catastrophic defeat. Maybe we'll never achieve the Great Society. But it's better to have tried and failed than never to have tried at all.

And even if we don't stamp out poverty entirely, the way we're waging the war on poverty will at least reduce it.

Those politicians and observers evidently have failed to understand the basically different approach in the 1965 attack on poverty from that of 1933.

In the great depression we thought the best way to attack poverty was to create

job opportunities, with vast public works projects, public buildings, highways, reforestation, dams, sewers, hospitals, auditoriums, national parks, harbors, histories, art projects, most of which were built, made payrolls possible, and are being enjoyed today.

There was no time then, as there is now, to attack poverty at its roots. There was little or no work for those who wanted work and had the training, skills, and experience to perform it. We had to make jobs and do it fast.

Today's war on poverty is attacking poverty where it starts. We are recognizing that America's great system of free public education is the most important ingredient in her enormous economic growth and power. So our 1965 war on poverty is geared to wipe out inherited poverty, by making sure that each child has a real educational opportunity, and by helping those who missed out on education to make up the deficiency.

The new war on poverty is aimed to inspire us all with the will to work and the ability to perform useful work.

Whether it be Head Start, the Job Corps, Volunteers in Service to America, or the other valuable programs, they are all aimed at helping the individual help himself, not at being a mere dole.

This kind of battle takes longer. The fruit of the Head Start program won't begin to ripen for 15 or more years.

The Job Corps, however, is beginning to bear fruit already as hundreds of young men who only a year ago had nothing to do but hang around the street corner, and little hope of anything else, go to work each day in technical, complicated jobs for which they have been especially trained.

They are happy. They are earning their own way. They are helping produce the wealth of America.

Let those who must sneer "whatever that is?" either try to convince the people that there is no such thing as poverty, or come forth with a better program.

Then they will have earned the right to sneer.

DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST U.S.

VIETNAM POLICY—AN OPEN LETTER TO THE MEN OF THE SECOND BATTALION, 7TH MARINES IN VIETNAM

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, without commenting on the number of student protests and demonstrations regarding our Vietnam policy, I thought my colleagues would be interested to learn of a student and his wife at the College of Business Administration, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oreg., who wrote an open letter to the men of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, in South Vietnam, to express their pride and gratitude to the men of that unit.

The letter was written by James A. O'Brien, Jr. and Sandi O'Brien. Jim is the son of one of my constituents, Mr. James A. O'Brien, of Honolulu, executive director of the Hawaii Association To Help Retarded Children.

If there are no objections, I respectfully request that the O'Briens' letter and response from Lt. Col. Leon N. Utter, USMC, commander of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, on behalf of his men, be reprinted in the RECORD in full.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

of the country. Author and lecturer, he is a member of the faculty at Purdue University's Life Insurance Marketing Institute and is the author of several books, including "Estate Planning" and "Tax Planning for Today and Tomorrow." One of his unique contributions has been the development of charitable endowment funded by life insurance.

Active in philanthropic and community activities, Mr. Goldberg is a trustee of the New York Law School, a member of the board of governors of the American Jewish Committee, a director of the New York chapter of the National Safety Council, and a director of several other organizations and institutions. He recently received from Vice President HUMPHREY the award of the National Council of Senior Citizens for his contributions in behalf of medicare legislation and has been cited in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for his services in behalf of interfaith understanding.

Richard Ferree Smith, director of immigration services of the American Friends Service Committee, was on the AFSC team that served the Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip in 1949. After the AFSC team withdrew, he remained another year in Gaza as a staff officer of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

Mr. Smith was formerly on the staff of the Philadelphia Health and Welfare Council and is a graduate of the Columbia School of Social Work.

Mr. Smith has been responsible for the AFSC refugee resettlement program in the United States. This program has involved helping East Europeans, Cubans, Chinese, Arabs, and Dutch Indonesians secure a new life in this country.

Mr. Smith is a member of the Executive Committee of the American Immigration and Citizenship Conference, a member of the Church World Service Department Committee of the Division of Overseas Ministries of the National Council of Churches, as well as many other committees dealing with immigration and refugee matters.

COMMITTEE FINANCES

In the 12 months ending June 30, 1965, the Committee received \$53,775 in contributions from individuals, corporations, organizations, and foundations. This total is almost exactly equal to the income for the previous year. Expenditure for staff and program has remained constant.

The Committee's staff of four persons is at the irreducible minimum; its expenses very small in relation to the size and importance of its program.

The Committee is greatly indebted to a number of corporations who assist us in our work—the J. Walter Thompson Co., the Irving Trust Co., Dennison Manufacturing Co., and others. Their generous assistance helps to make possible the Committee's work at minimum cost.

The Committee's accounts are audited annually by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

We strongly urge our readers to use the contributor's envelope inserted in this issue. We depend entirely on the gifts—both large and small—of our friends, and we are most hopeful that you will make your contribution now for the work of the Committee, and for assistance to refugees.

Contributions to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, Inc., are tax deductible.

USCR GIFT WRAP

The Committee has once more sponsored the sale of its "Tree of Life" gift wrap during the autumn and pre-Christmas weeks. The paper is offered in an attractive gold pattern on red, green, blue, and white. The package, comprising 8 sheets in the 4 colors, as well as 10 gift tags, is being sold at \$2.

No. 197—32

The paper, this year as last, was designed by Mr. Thomas F. Naegele of the J. Walter Thompson Co. Mr. Naegele, a brilliant artist, is called Mr. Christmas by some of his friends; he was the designer last year, not only of our gift wrap, but also of the series of five Christmas stamps issued by the U.S. Post Office.

The design has been executed and the paper manufactured by the Dennison Manufacturing Co. We hope our friends will buy it in great quantities and encourage their friends to buy it also.

USCR SCHOLARSHIP FUND

For several years there has been a felt need for scholarship assistance to both young refugees who need help in completing their college or university training and also refugees of more mature years who may need vocational or professional retraining in order to adapt to employment opportunities in the United States.

Mr. Daniel F. Cary, a member of the board of USCR, has made an initial grant to the USCR scholarship fund which is available to acceptable candidates on a revolving-loan-fund basis.

Mr. Cary believes that, in addition to loans, the Committee should be in a position to offer "grants-in-aid" in many situations where repayment of loans is unfeasible.

Mr. Cary strongly hopes, therefore, that there will be further contributions to the scholarship fund which can be made available, either as loans or grants, as circumstances may require.

We believe that there is no more satisfying investment than this; that donors will receive deep satisfaction from the knowledge that their gifts are being used in the education of young men or women trying to become established in their new homeland.

We know from experience that this is an investment in America's future, and we commend it to the utmost generosity of our friends.

JACOB BLAUSTEIN HONORED BY SPECIAL GIFT

Mr. Henry Zarrow, president of the Sooner Pipe and Supply Corp. of Tulsa, Okla., has made a contribution of \$500 to the work of the U.S. Committee for Refugees in honor of Mr. Jacob Blaustein.

Mr. Blaustein, who was a founder member of this Committee and is an active member of its board, was honored by Mr. Zarrow because, as Mr. Zarrow wrote, "Mr. Blaustein is a wonderful person who gives much of his time and talents working in the cause of humanity."

Mr. Blaustein was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the 10th General Assembly of the United Nations; Consultant to the American Delegation at the San Francisco United Nations Organization Conference; Member of President Truman's Mobilization Policy Board during the Korean War; former President of the American Jewish Committee; and cofounder of the American Oil Co. He is on the Board of Directors of Standard Oil Co. (Indiana).

The Committee is deeply grateful to Mr. Zarrow for this generous and graceful tribute to a great American.

AN ENCOURAGEMENT TO US ALL

On August 2, 1964, Vice President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, then a Senator, entered the annual survey issue of the World Refugee Report into the Record of the U.S. Senate. On that occasion Mr. HUMPHREY said, "Mr. President, the U.S. Committee for Refugees, a private citizens committee with whose work many of us are familiar, has recently published its annual survey of the world's refugee problems. This survey, unique of its kind, gives precise information about the various refugee communities around the

world and about the efforts of the intergovernmental and American voluntary agencies to meet the needs of these refugees.

"To the best of my knowledge, this publication is the only place where this information is available in such useful form. Many of us know of and participate in the work of the American voluntary agencies and we are all proud of the widespread and generous interest of the American public in this most unhappy problem. Many private and public groups find this information to be essential in carrying out their efforts in behalf of refugees.

"We all feel a sense of indebtedness to the U.S. Committee for Refugees for their persisting efforts in helping the American public to understand the gravity of the refugee problems around the world. Their work is an encouragement to us all to continue our efforts to solve these refugee problems."

The effect of Mr. HUMPHREY's generous action was that the World Refugee Report was circulated to all the subscribers to the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD including many public libraries. In addition, copies were requested for circulation by the U.S. Information Agency to its overseas libraries; it was reprinted in full in "The International Altruist" and the statistical information about refugees was reprinted in a number of other publications including the Bulletin of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies in Geneva.

We recite this record for readers of the current issue, many of whom will be seeing the World Refugee Report for the first time. It is the major publication of the U.S. Committee for Refugees and we think we may be justly proud of its growing usefulness.

In the preparation of this issue, we have had the cooperation of 50 agencies—private, governmental, and intergovernmental. The global work of these organizations in behalf of refugees, represented by their reports to us, is eloquent testimony to the magnitude of the continuing refugee problem. We want to express our thanks to the officers and members of these organizations for their help.

We want also to express our gratitude to the individuals who have contributed articles providing background information for this issue: William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; Harlan Cleveland, U.S. Ambassador to NATO; Charles H. Jordan, director general, Joint Distribution Committee; Senator EDWARD M. KENNEDY, U.S. Senate; George Meany, president, AFL-CIO.

THE AUTO PARTS AGREEMENT WITH CANADA

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a statement by Senator HARTKE be placed in the RECORD at this point, with an article which appeared in the Miami Herald on October 4.

There being no objection, the statement and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR HARTKE

I would like to bring to the attention of the Senate a Chicago Daily News article written by Frank Flaherty and entitled "Will Auto Agreement With U.S. Hurt Pearson?" which appeared in the Miami Herald on October 4, 1965. This article concerns the recently passed Canadian Auto Parts Agreement.

I am sure the Senate is well aware of my opinion of this legislation. I have always felt this legislation to be wholly one sided;

October 21, 1965

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UNIVERSITY OF OREGON,
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
Eugene, Ore., August 9, 1965.

MEN OF THE 2D BATTALION, 7TH MARINES,
Care of Lt. Col. Leon Utter, USMC, Qui Nhon,
Binh Din Province, South Vietnam.

DEAR SIR: After reading about you in the enclosed news story we decided to write to let you know that we are proud of you all and grateful for all you are doing for the United States. We follow Vietnam developments closely and this is the first story we've seen which shows that we Americans can beat the Vietcong at their own game. If this dirty war is ever to end, I'm sure it will be more because of actions like yours, than by air strikes or naval bombardment.

I attend the University of Oregon in Eugene, Ore., and my wife and I thought that after reading or hearing stories about college student and faculty protests against American in Vietnam you might appreciate hearing some praise for a change.

Thanks again for what you're doing and good luck.

Sincerely,

JIM AND SANDI O'BRIEN.

HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION, 7TH
MARINES, 3D MARINE DIVISION
(REIN), FMF (MAR. NO. 14), FPO,
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

OUTSIDE, QUI NHON,
SOUTH VIETNAM,
August 21, 1965.

Mr. and Mrs. JIM O'BRIEN,
c/o University of Oregon,
Eugene, Ore.

DEAR MR. AND MRS. O'BRIEN: We of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, are deeply appreciative of your letter of August 11.

I took the liberty of having the letter reproduced and distributed to all our outlying detachments. We have a few more than 1,500 men here and we are scattered in outposts over 92 million square meters of hills and valleys. Morale is exceptionally high—our casualties have been light and mail service is regular.

The reception your letter received was enthusiastic throughout the entire command. Comments ranged from, "How about that?" to "I told you most college guys were smart. Only a few are the beatnik types."

We are all of the firm conviction out here that our job is a necessary one. While the student and faculty protests are irksome and somewhat undermine the positive results we achieve in the field, we sometimes rationalize such behavior with the question, "Where else in the world could they do it except in the United States?"

Needless to say, it makes us all particularly proud when someone like you exercises his right of free speech in a positive manner.

Your letter has more than compensated for what we've read, and 1,500 U.S. Marines send their thanks.

Most sincerely,

LEON N. UTTER,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC (for the
men of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines).

THE ROLE OF TAX POLICY IN THE GREAT SOCIETY

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an address entitled "The Role of Tax Policy in the Great Society," delivered by the Honorable Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, at the Financial Analysts Federation Conference.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE ROLE OF TAX POLICY IN THE GREAT SOCIETY

(Remarks by the Honorable Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, at the Financial Analysts Federation Conference, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., Tuesday, October 5, 1965)

Under President Johnson's leadership, this Nation has begun the challenging task of building a Great Society.

Substantial progress has been achieved and a sound foundation for the structure is being laid.

The Great Society will rest upon two major supports—national consensus and economic prosperity.

As the Congress finishes a session which is outstanding in our history for its achievements and as our economy continues strong in a recordbreaking expansion, these two supports appear sound indeed.

Prospects for future achievements are bright.

The goals are many, but some stand out. Clearly, we must do all in our power to:

Give the 35 million people who now suffer the despair of poverty the opportunity to earn a decent life for themselves and a better life for their children.

Give all our children full opportunity to educate and equip themselves to take a constructive part in carrying this society forward.

Give all Americans the opportunity to fulfill their own best hope of achievement, that we may fulfill the promise offered when this land was born.

Make our countryside and our cities more beautiful, healthier, safer, and better places in which to live and work.

Meet our commitments, written and unwritten, throughout the world to those people who look to us in their need for release from ignorance, misery, and hunger.

I would like to consider what role tax policy has to play in achieving the goals of this Great Society.

GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY

Certainly the Great Society will involve Federal expenditures and our tax system must raise the funds to meet those expenditures. In an earlier day this could mark the end of my talk. But today's knowledge has brought us deeper insights.

The accomplishment of the Great Society will require an ever-growing economic base—a base adequate to meet the demands which that society will place on Federal expenditures, State and local government expenditures, and private expenditures.

In our war on poverty, in our efforts to foster education, equal opportunity, health and natural beauty, and in our campaign to improve urban life, economic prosperity is not only essential—it is the most powerful weapon we have.

Government policies must therefore be directed both to achieving an economic growth that matches our potential and to enabling us to keep that potential constantly expanding. We must achieve full employment and then go on to provide an adequate rate of economic growth at full employment.

The use of fiscal policy in meeting these demands is today, as a result of the accomplishments of these last 5 years, far more broad and flexible than most had supposed.

The success of the tax reduction involved in the Revenue Act of 1964 has marked the turning point. This tax reduction, though it came in a period of deficits, brought the larger GNP and larger revenue base that the administration and many economists foresaw. Recognition of this success of the 1964 act tax reduction was a large factor in the speed with which the Excise Tax Reduction Act—involving a further \$4 billion staged reduction—was enacted this year by the Congress.

If we did not have the investment credit of 1962, the depreciation reform of 1962—which was liberalized early this year—the 1964 and 1965 individual and corporate income tax reductions, and the excise tax reduction of 1965, next year the Federal tax burden would be more than \$20 billion heavier than it will now be.

That is the reduction in tax liabilities measured at a constant income level. But there was no corresponding reduction in actual revenue receipts. As President Johnson said recently:

"I am happy to report that even with such massive tax reduction, we anticipate that Federal revenues for the 5-year period, fiscal 1961 to 1966, will have increased by over \$18 billion—almost twice the increase over the previous 5 years when there were no tax cuts at all."

All this has permitted us, I believe—Government economists and business analysts alike—an increasing objectivity in assessing the role of Federal budget policy in our financial system. We are no longer hampered by such rigidities that a budget deficit is always bad—we cannot automatically identify the villain by seeing if he writes in red ink.

For we are now aware that adding a group of expenditures that differ widely in their form—loans, grants, current expenses, capital items—and then achieving a zero balance when these are subtracted from revenues in itself can guarantee nothing as to the direction the economy will move. And we are also aware of such things as fiscal drag and the power of our revenue system yearly to increase its take from the private sector of the economy—at present by about \$7 billion annually—and of the need each year to offset that fiscal drag. That doesn't mean that tax reduction is always desirable and must occur every year or that it is always preferable to increased expenditures and is never to yield to debt retirement.

Each year will require its own decisions. They will depend on our expenditure requirements—in terms of domestic needs and foreign obligations—and on the economic outlook—in terms of the need to maximize employment and avoid inflation.

We have balanced these things well in moving toward an interim goal of 4 percent unemployment.

This course is not an easy one to pilot. Like hidden shoals, we will encounter unexpected developments. At times these developments will require rapid temporary adjustments in our fiscal policy—such as quick tax cuts.

It would be beneficial, now that the effects of tax reduction on the economy are better understood, to reach a consensus on the form that a temporary tax change should take so that we thereby would be able, with that consensus in hand, to achieve a speedy enactment if a temporary reduction were ever needed. An appropriate congressional hearing held now for this purpose, before the need ever arises, would be useful in reaching such consensus.

I have talked so far in aggregate terms, and in these terms tax reduction has mainly meant a broad attack on inadequate private expenditures and investment incentives. In the Revenue Act of 1964, and in the recent Excise Tax Reduction Act, we provided a substantial stimulus to consumer demand which serves, of course, to provide the market to induce and support our remarkable increase in business investment. We have also reduced corporate tax rates, and provided the special measures of an investment credit and the depreciation guidelines. Together these business tax measures have meant an increased cash flow and considerably higher after-tax rates of return.

In the Treasury we have begun an intensive study of the investment experience in

the past few years to isolate if we can the impact of depreciation reform and the investment credit. We are trying to learn more about our depreciation system, the guidelines and the reserve ratio test through a complex computer study of the effects of varying depreciation rates and lives against the manifold patterns of asset holdings, replacements and retirements that our businesses present.

At the same time, through trips abroad by our experts, we are bringing up-to-date our knowledge of the handling of depreciation under the tax systems of other countries, so that we can consider the comparative position of the U.S. approach.

Finally, in the area of business taxation we are aware of the need for more research regarding the appropriate relationship between the corporate tax and the individual income tax. But a look at the recent foreign changes illustrates the complexities involved in this relationship, and the need to define the goals before coming to any conclusion about whether a change is either necessary or appropriate.

The U.S. approach is basically that of a corporate tax separated from the individual tax, with no adjustment (apart from the \$100 dividend exclusion) for the possibility that corporate profits may be taxed at two levels, once as profits to the corporation and once as dividends to individuals. I call this a possibility in view of the considerable uncertainty about whether the corporate tax is shifted.

However, many economists have favored the so-called British approach, under which the two taxes are integrated through the shareholder getting a credit at his level for the corporate tax, and with his dividend grossed up to reflect corporate profits before the corporate tax. Some would even go further and apply this credit and grossed-up inclusion in shareholder income automatically, without the need for a actual distribution by the corporation. But the British this year abandoned their approach in favor of the U.S. approach, though with a lower corporate rate, probably 40 percent.

Meanwhile the French, who previously had the U.S. approach, shifted this year halfway to the former British approach, by giving the shareholder on the gross-up approach a credit for one-half of the corporate tax.

Both the British and the French did not follow the German technique, which grants the corporation a much lower corporate rate (15 percent as against 51 percent) on the corporate profits that are distributed to the shareholders.

The Canadians, who now use a very rough version of the former British approach—they give the shareholder a credit of 20 percent of the dividend without any grossing up of the dividend—are, through their Royal Commission, studying whether they should consider a change.

The key to all these different approaches—bewildering as they are in their variety and susceptibility to change—is probably that the changes are designed to achieve different goals.

The British desire to encourage more corporate investment and hope their change will achieve that by favoring the retention of corporate profits over their distribution. The French appear to desire a greater shareholder participation by their investors, and hence have focused on inducements to the distribution of dividends—a factor which underlies the German approach though with a different technique.

Here in the United States we have stressed corporate investment—witness the investment credit—and hence adequate corporate cash flow and after-tax rate of return. We have recognized that we already possess through our developed capital markets and other institutional factors strong forces in

the direction of shareholder participation. Hence our present needs exert a strong pressure for retention of the status quo in the structure of corporate taxation—still leaving room for rate reduction at an appropriate time.

The British have also recognized the relationship between these corporate patterns and the capital gains tax. Thus, along with their move to strengthen corporate retention of profits they have adopted a capital gains tax on the American model, but with inclusion of one-half of the gain, a maximum 30-percent rate, a 1-year holding period for long-term gains (3 years in the case of real estate), taxation at death of unrealized appreciation in value, and with corporate gains subject to tax at regular rates.

ELIMINATION OF POVERTY

Probably the most important goal of the Great Society is the elimination of poverty. This is an extraordinarily complex problem and we are only now beginning to learn about it as we grapple with it. It is an area where the human needs are so compelling that they demand the best we have to offer in both innovation and ingenuity in devising measures—both Government and private—to meet them.

Our tax system must make a maximum contribution to this effort.

The 1964 act lessened the tax burden in this area—with its reduction of the starting rate from 20 to 14 percent and with the adoption of the minimum standard deduction, so that a single individual became taxable at \$900 instead of \$666, a married couple at \$1,600 instead of \$1,333, and a married couple with two children at \$3,000 instead of \$2,667. Moreover, the Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965, by eliminating many Federal excise taxes, further reduced the burden of Federal taxes on this group.

Looking at our system as it now stands, the poor pay primarily, as Federal taxes, the excises on alcohol and tobacco and the income tax where poverty levels may be above the present dividing line between taxable and nontaxable income. They also pay the gasoline tax, which is a user charge associated with the highway trust fund, and the social security and medicare payroll taxes, which involve a saving for pensions and medical care. In looking at the tax structure, it is clear that the income tax impact deserves our first attention, and the President has said that any future income tax reduction should cover those who live in the shadow of poverty. This suggests at least a change which raises to a higher level of income the dividing line between taxable and nontaxable income.

This Nation cannot afford to continue indefinitely to tax people who cannot afford to pay.

As incomes increased in past years for the population as a whole, the nature of our tax structure over those years—relatively fixed rates and exemption levels—increased the tax burden on lower income taxpayers, as they moved from a nontaxable status to a taxable status, from the lowest bracket rate to a higher rate.

Even our massive income tax reduction in the last 2 years has only set this process back about 5 years.

And even with such reduction, over the past 15 years an examination of effective tax rates (the percentage of overall income actually paid in tax) shows:

A family earning half the national average income (\$2,200 in 1950, \$4,000 today) went from an effective tax rate of zero to almost 4 percent;

A family earning the national average income went from an effective tax rate of 6½ to 9 percent;

A family earning double the national average income stayed roughly the same;

Higher income families either held their

own or realized reductions, often substantial, in their effective tax rates as increased incomes were offset by increased deductions or a greater proportion of capital gains.

Indeed, the spread of effective tax rates is greatest for higher income taxpayers, varying from zero to around 66 percent. Correspondingly, the average effective rate for very high income taxpayers is much lower than is generally realized. For instance, all taxpayers who in 1962 reported adjusted gross incomes of more than \$1 million would—at present tax table rates—pay an average effective rate of only 26 percent of their overall income (including capital gain income in full). Furthermore, only 9 percent of those taxpayers would have effective rates of over 50 percent on overall income under present tax table rates.

All this reinforces President Johnson's view that the next tax reduction should focus on the lower income groups.

We are constantly gaining more knowledge of the weapons with which to carry out our war on poverty. Some of the approaches are associated with the sheer alleviation of destitution, through providing funds directly. Others involve programs of income maintenance to counteract the forces which can undercut a person's income. Others look to programs of education, relocation, training and the like to help people raise themselves and their children out of poverty, and to provide employment for those who are employable. As we gain this knowledge we will be in a better position to judge the contribution which a tax system can make in this effort.

TAX EQUITY AND TAX SIMPLIFICATION

A nation that seeks improvement in its society is likely to insist on the improvement of that aspect of Government which exerts a widespread and significant effect on that society—the Federal tax system itself. The tax activity of the past few years has increased public interest in obtaining the fairest and simplest tax system possible.

Tax equity is a complex matter. Two persons may have the same amount of income—wages, net business income, net investment income, capital gains—but the income tax on one may be far higher than on the other. The variance comes about because the income tax has differing treatments for various types of income and for various types of family expenditures, primarily those involving personal expenses. Thus, for example, on the income side, capital gains are taxed at lower rates; on the expenditure side, deductions are allowed for charitable contributions, personal interest, State and local taxes, medical expenses, and so on.

The difficulty in all this lies in deciding which differences in income source and expenditures should be significant for income tax purposes. While economists may, as a whole, agree that the significant differences are few, the Congress has taken a much broader approach. It has shaped our present income tax structure by giving recognition to a wide variety of these differences. And yet there is constant change. Thus, in recent years Congress has said that moving expenses involve an expenditure difference to be recognized under the income tax, and has increased the effect given to child-care expenses. But through restrictions on deductions for certain State and local taxes, casualty losses and entertainment expenses, the significance of these expenditures was lessened. Through elimination of the dividend credit, the significance of receiving current investment income from stocks as against employment income was almost eliminated. Through inclusion of certain group term life insurance, the significance of this difference in the composition of employment income was lessened. Through the adoption of averaging, the significance of yearly variations in income receipt was

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
 AIDS IN GOOD INVESTMENT

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, the American Enterprise Institute of Washington, D.C., has just published its handbook for the current national intercollegiate debates entitled "Crime and Law Enforcement."

Most of us in the Senate share a great concern that the crime problem has become one of our Nation's most serious and pressing domestic concerns. I have already expressed my deep belief that the alarming rapid rise in crime demands that we mobilize all the Nation's resources to combat this scourge on every front. It is, therefore, timely and appropriate that the sponsors of the national intercollegiate debates have selected as the topic to be argued by the young men and women of our universities and colleges this year the proposition, "Resolved: That Law Enforcement Agencies Should Be Given Greater Freedom in the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime."

The AEI debate handbook is designed to serve as a guide to start the student's research but, more importantly, it is intended to stimulate the individual to explore and consider all the varied implications connected with the critical question of crime and law enforcement. Such encouragement of thoughtful consideration of today's major public policy issues by our young people does much to create an informed and interested generation, essential for the future welfare of our Nation.

The handbook is another example of AEI's public service of the same high quality as the legislative analyses series which AEI offers to all Members of Congress to assist us in our study of important legislative issues.

Over the years I have found the AEI legislative analyses to be concise, scrupulously balanced and factual analyses of the significant legislative measures pending before us. I know that the analyses have been of immeasurable assistance to me in my deliberations. I commend AEI on the high standards of scholarship and objectivity which it has achieved in this most worthwhile public service.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I am pleased that Senator Hruska has spoken of the American Enterprise Institute. The publications of this unusual organization have been of considerable assistance to me. I have found their analyses to be objective and reliable, which is no small achievement when analyzing proposed legislation that is almost always controversial.

Last month, AEI sponsored a seminar on the balance of payments. Sixteen eminent international economists from the United States, England, Switzerland, Peru, Brazil, and Canada gave diverse opinions on proposals to solve our intricate, perplexing payments problem. The Institute will publish the proceedings of this seminar. When this book is issued, I am sure we will find another valuable contribution from the academic world toward the solution of another difficult public problem.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. President, I would to join the Senators who are taking a moment this morning to give a word of

thanks to the American Enterprise Institute. AEI has been of considerable assistance to me and my staff during my time in Congress. Their analyses of some of the important legislation we have discussed this session have been thorough, factual, and nonpartisan. Their research is a very real contribution to good government.

As a member of the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress, I appreciate the fact that AEI is sponsoring a task force of 13 political scientists who are putting their minds and experience to work on finding methods through which Congress might be strengthened and streamlined. The contributions of men and women from the academic world to our society have been of great worth, in the past, and I am sure that this study will be most helpful to the Organization Committee.

Mr. MONTROYA. The American Enterprise Institute inaugurated this session a new publication that I find an excellent timesaver. It is the new press summary. I am sure there is not a Senator present who has the time to read the number of newspapers that he would like in order to keep informed on varied opinions.

I have found the AEI press summary to be an essential timesaver by providing meaningful excerpts from the daily press. This publication has permitted me and my staff to keep abreast of the thoughts and opinions of our leading journalists on the most important stories of the day.

The format of the press summary provides easy access to news topics. The excerpting techniques are commendable for their thoroughness without being unwieldy.

on
 SOUTH VIETNAM—WHY WE ARE
 THERE

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, many people in my State write about South Vietnam. The net of their interest is more explanation as to why we are there.

Nowhere have I seen those reasons presented more logically than in a recent address by Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance at the annual dinner of the National Security Industrial Association.

I would hope that all people who are interested in preventing a general war, and who look forward to a more peaceful world, would read this short address.

In that connection, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted at this point in the Record an article by Neal Stanford in the Christian Science Monitor, "U.S. Intrigued, Peiping Manifesto Studied."

I also ask that the full text of the address of Secretary Vance be inserted at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article and address were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Christian Science Monitor,
 Oct. 11, 1965]

PEIPING MANIFESTO STUDIED
 (By Neal Stanford)

WASHINGTON.—Not one American in a thousand—possibly a million—knows who Lin Piao is.

But currently Marshal Lin is the most discussed, read, and debated individual among the Pentagon's top echelon, by the State Department's policy planners, and in most foreign chancelleries.

Marshal Lin is vice chairman of the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, vice premier of Communist China, and the Minister of National Defense.

He has suddenly grabbed the Washington spotlight because some weeks ago, on the 20th anniversary of the defeat of Japan, he delivered an 18,000-word manifesto which the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus R. Vance, says is "no ordinary commemorative article."

In fact, Mr. Vance and his colleagues in the Pentagon, not to mention some in the State Department, in the White House and along Embassy Row, consider Marshal Lin's political document just about the most important thing to come out of Peiping since mainland China's Communist Party boss, Mao Tse-tung, advanced his famous thesis: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

INTENTIONS PROBED

This Lin Piao document not only tells what Peiping's intentions are in Asia, in Vietnam, toward the United States, but what its intentions are on the question of the whole expansion of world communism. It is Peiping's "Mein Kampf." It is Peiping's blueprint for world domination for a thousand years.

The Lin Piao manifesto should, say Mr. Vance and others, be "must" reading for all those who wonder what the United States is doing in Vietnam, who appear to have never given any thought to what Peiping is doing in Vietnam, what its ambitions are in south Asia, in Africa, and Latin America.

The Pentagon thinks seriously enough of Marshal Lin's pontifications to have had its No. 2 man, Deputy Secretary Vance, discuss it at length the other night before the cream of the country's industrial and military leaders.

In speaking of the Russian revolution and the Chinese Communist revolution, Marshal Lin says: "The Russian revolution began with armed uprisings in the cities, and then spread to the countryside; while the Chinese revolution won nationwide victory through the encirclement of the cities from the rural areas, and the final capture of the cities." And then he goes on to assert: "The rural areas of the world today are Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The cities of the world are North America and Western Europe."

His thesis, then, is that just as communism in China succeeded by capturing the countryside, and then encircling and defeating the cities, so the global Communist movement will ultimately succeed first by capturing Asia, Africa, and Latin America—thereby encircling North America and Western Europe—and then by finally and decisively defeating the United States and its Western allies.

And where is this to begin, asks Marshal Lin rhetorically?

It has already begun, he says, in Vietnam. Vietnam, he says, is the "focus" of the revolutionary movement against the United States. "The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution," he continues.

And he falls back on another famous Mao Tse-tung thesis to urge on the Vietcong: "The imperialists and all reactionaries are paper tigers."

FIGHTING IN VIETNAM

Marshal Lin, therefore, does not deplore the fighting in Vietnam—he welcomes it. What the Communist world needs, he makes clear, is more of these "wars of national liberation"—"people's wars launched in different parts of the world."

And he winds up his manifesto with this challenge to the United States: "If you want to send troops, go ahead. The more the better. We will annihilate as many as you can send."

That is bold, tough talk.

But, asks Mr. Vance, who is this "we" who are to do the annihilating?

In Vietnam, at least, says Mr. Vance, it is not Peiping that is doing the fighting. It is Hanoi. "Mao is not risking his own troops to achieve his ends. Rather, Hanoi is being used to attempt to prove the validity of Lin Piao's thesis," Mr. Vance points out.

"For the whole point of Mao's doctrine is that Hanoi and the Vietcong should fight on; and they should reject any offers of reasonable settlement or negotiation; that they should be prepared to wage a prolonged and dirty war—whatever its cost in North Vietnamese blood."

It was Gen. Nguyen Giap, the North Vietnamese strategist who defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu, who candidly said recently: "South Vietnam is the model of the national-liberation movement of our time. If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated anywhere in the world."

If Americans want to know why the United States is fighting in Vietnam, concludes Mr. Vance, they can read President Johnson's repeated explanations—or they can read Mao Tse-tung, Marshal Lin, and General Giap.

REMARKS BY DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CYRUS R. VANCE AT THE ANNUAL DINNER
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY INDUSTRIAL
ASSOCIATION

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I am honored to be here, and to participate in your 22d annual dinner.

I deeply appreciate this opportunity to speak before a group so concerned as you are with the security of our country, and so directly involved with the preservation of its strength and freedom.

Exactly 5 weeks ago tonight—in a distant country—a political document appeared.

It was written by the defense minister of the most populous nation on earth.

It was written by Lin Piao (the vice chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party—Vice Premier of Red China, and the Minister of National Defense.

Ostensibly, it is an article commemorating the 20th anniversary of the defeat of Japan in World War II. But that was merely a convenient occasion for its publication. For it is no ordinary commemorative article.

I want to talk to you about that document tonight. For it tells us not only what Peiping's intentions are in Asia—not only what Peiping's intentions are in Vietnam—not only what Peiping's intentions are toward the United States—but what Peiping's plans are for the whole expansion of world communism.

The document begins with a lengthy analysis of the Communist revolution in China.

Lin Piao states bluntly:

It was on the basis of the lessons derived from the people's wars in China that Comrade Mao Tse-tung, using the simplest and most vivid language, advanced the famous thesis that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." He clearly pointed out: The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war is the central task and highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries.

Lin Piao then goes on to note that the Chinese Communist revolution differed from the Russian revolution in one essential respect. The Russian revolution, he says, "began with armed uprisings in the cities, and then spread to the countryside; while the Chinese revolution won nationwide vic-

tory through the encirclement of the cities from the rural areas, and the final capture of the cities."

Now, he comes to his central point. The "rural areas of the world" today, he asserts, are Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The "cities of the world" are North America, and Western Europe.

Just as communism in China, says Lin Piao, succeeded by capturing the countryside; and then encircling and defeating the cities; so the global Communist movement will ultimately succeed first by capturing Asia, Africa, and Latin America—thereby encircling North America and Western Europe—and then by finally and decisively defeating the United States and its Western allies.

Win Asia, Africa, and Latin America through "wars of national liberation," says Lin Piao, and the United States and its Western allies will be surrounded, will be encircled, will be overwhelmed.

And where is all this to begin? he asks.

It has already begun, he replies. And the place in which it has begun is Vietnam.

Vietnam, says Lin Piao, is now the focus of the revolutionary movement against the United States. No matter what action America may take in Vietnam, he adds, the Communist Chinese determination is unshakable to drive the United States out.

But, ladies and gentlemen, it is not Peiping that is fighting in Vietnam; it is Hanoi. Mao is not risking his own troops to achieve his ends. Rather, Hanoi is being used to attempt to prove the validity of his thesis.

For the whole point of Mao's doctrine is that Hanoi and the Vietcong should fight on; that they should reject any offers of reasonable settlement or negotiation; that they should be prepared to wage a prolonged and dirty war—whatever its cost in North Vietnamese blood; whatever its cost in North Vietnamese well-being.

Hanoi might well ponder whether its future is best secured by fully submerging its own separate interest to Peiping. The North Vietnamese people deserve a better future than that.

Meanwhile, the leaders in Hanoi—much to Peiping's pleasure—continue to make a reasonable settlement impossible. They continue their aggression in the south. They continue to infiltrate soldiers, equipment, and supplies across the border. They continue to employ the twin pressures of temptation and terrorism—tempting the peasants to renounce their loyalty to their village leaders in return for hollow promises; and terrorizing them if they refuse.

Ladies and gentlemen, there could be no clearer justification of why we are standing firm in our resolve to help defend the 14 million people of South Vietnam, against Communist aggression and subversion from the north.

What is the U.S. policy there?

Our policy is simple and straightforward. It is not complicated by any doctrinaire theories of world domination.

First, we are determined to keep our commitment to the people of South Vietnam. We are going to continue to assist the South Vietnamese to resist aggression. We are going to continue to make it clear to Hanoi and to Peiping that terrorism, murder, subversion, and infiltration from the north cannot—and will not—succeed.

As President Johnson has pointed out:

"We are . . . there to strengthen world order. Around the globe from Berlin to Thailand are people whose well-being rests in part on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war."

Second, we are committed to help create

a better life for the people of South Vietnam. We are engaged in a major program of economic and social development there, and we want to see it extended to the whole South Asia region, including North Vietnam.

Everything that we do in Vietnam is governed by those simple reasons for being there.

Our goal is a peaceful settlement. We are ready—now—to go to the negotiating table. We lay down no preconditions for such discussions. We seek a cessation of aggression by North Vietnam. We seek a just peace—and we have made that offer clear on many occasions. We seek the withdrawal of all foreign forces—including our own—from South Vietnam once peace has been restored. And we seek a peace that guarantees freedom of choice for the South Vietnamese people.

Our purpose is firm; our patience is long; and our perseverance is unshakable.

But, as both Hanoi and Peiping have pointed out, the issue is larger than merely Vietnam.

General Giap, the North Vietnamese strategist who defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu, has put the matter candidly: "South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation movement of our times. If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated anywhere in the world."

And—as we have seen—Lin Piao describes the struggle in Vietnam as merely the curtain raiser in the whole global drama of Communist expansionism.

The issue, then, in Vietnam, important as it is, is not the only task facing the United States and its partners in freedom around the world.

It is an essential task. But it is not the total task.

The total task of free men on this planet is to preserve and nurture freedom everywhere that it is growing.

Lin Piao sees a major crisis in human society in the second half of the 20th century; he sees it taking place on the perimeter of the industrialized world—in Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America.

I think we can agree with him on that.

Let us examine why.

We can begin by reminding ourselves that the Communist mind is a curious combination of ideological rigidity—and tactical suppleness.

The Communist mind is, at one and the same time, philosophically closed—and pragmatically open.

In the past half century we have witnessed an imaginative display of aggressive Communist tactics.

The goal has always been the same: political domination. But the path to that goal has often switched direction.

In our own lifetime, Communist tactics have ranged through a broad and brutal spectrum: everything from outright occupation by the Red army in Eastern Europe, through conventional aggression in Korea, to the guerrilla operations in Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, and now in Vietnam.

Communist tactics have sometimes fomented revolutions, and at other times have captured those initiated by others.

Communist tactics have learned to be as much at home with legal means, as with illegal means; with sophisticated societies, as with primitive ones; with rightist dictators, as with leftist demagogues.

Thus, if one surveys the total Communist movement of the past half century, one cannot fail to be struck with a profound bit of irony; that the Communists in their ultimate view of history are almost insufferably dogmatic and doctrinaire. But in their efforts to manipulate that history, they are almost incredibly pragmatic and practical.

What, then, is our answer to the Communist manifesto of Mao Tse-tung, as written by Lin Piao?

First, our answer is that we agree that the focus of the challenge lies, at the moment, in Vietnam.

But the Government of Vietnam and the United States will not be defeated by Communist aggression from the north. We will continue our support of the people of South Vietnam until a just and reasonable settlement is reached—whether by agreement at a conference table or by a cessation of the aggression, as in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Greece.

Second, we agree with Mao that the lands arching across the southern half of the globe—Asia, Africa, and Latin America—are to play a decisive role in the future of humanity.

But we disagree that their role is to be the hapless victims of Communist externally directed so-called wars of national liberation. On the contrary, we believe that these nations desire to remain fully and freely themselves—uncoerced by subversion stage-managed and supplied from without. We believe that these nations desire, with wisdom and dignity, to seek their own national progress in their own national way. And we stand ready to assist them to do precisely that.

Third, we agree that Mao's clear intent is that his brand of communism should eventually surround, encircle, and finally cut off and defeat Western Europe and the United States.

But we disagree that that is going to happen. Our defenses are strong, and we remain alert and ready for whatever the future may bring. But more important is the fact that the free nations of the world offer a better future for the individual, and a peaceful path to that future.

Finally, we agree with Mao that just as there are cities and countryside within nations, so the world at large—in its current uneven rate of technological advance—can be viewed as a series of industrialized centers, surrounded by a less-developed countryside.

But we disagree that the historical process suggests that the global countryside will storm these centers, and put them to the torch of Communist insurgency.

On the contrary, we believe that the historical process will be precisely the reverse; that the industrialized centers—the fortunate nations of the world—will increasingly seek to bring to the countryside—to the poorer nations of the world—the very assistance and skill that will help these nations to close the poverty gap. And the rich nations will do this by measures that will share talents and resources—by measures that will increase the self-confidence and self-reliance of the poorer nations to achieve their own self-sustaining political and economic growth.

In the United States we issue no global manifestos.

But we do indulge in one dream. We do entertain one grand vision. We do look to one great goal.

We are dedicated to continuing the dialog with the rest of the world that began in an obscure hall in Philadelphia on July 4, 1776.

The men in that hall were revolutionaries. The men in that hall did not believe that true political power can grow out of the barrel of a gun. They believed that true political power can grow only out of the people themselves—for that is precisely where it is: within each individual human being.

Those men did not rant about class struggle. They said bluntly that all men are created equal.

Those men did not theorize about a dictatorship of the proletariat. They proposed something far more explosive than that. They declared that all men had an inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Those men in 1776 fused, primed, and set off a political explosion that has had more ultimate effect on society than all the dictators of history rolled into one.

The fires of that revolution still burn in this country; and the sparks of that revolution still fly, igniting the tinder of human aspiration all over this globe.

One of the greatest challenges to this generation of Americans is to refine the formulas for creating the driving sparks, for cultivating the leadership talent, for unleashing and organizing the earth's bountiful natural resources, for breaking down the out-of-date barriers to progress throughout the world. We have an enormous challenge to perfect the formulas to do all of these things to permit what Lin Piao calls "the countryside" to find their way up the rocky path. We must meet that challenge. We must offer the more durable stuff of true, creative revolution.

Lin Piao's statement of Communist China's goals for the world is 18,000 words long.

President Johnson has summed up our goals for the world in three simple sentences:

"Our own freedom and growth have never been the final goal of the American dream. We were never meant to be an oasis of liberty and abundance in a worldwide desert of disappointed dreams. Our Nation was created to help strike away the chains of ignorance and misery and tyranny wherever they keep man less than God means him to be."

Ladies and gentlemen, it is for you and me—and all of us on this small, whirling planet—to insure that this forecast will prevail.

CONGRESS LOSES A HELPING HAND

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I note from the RECORD of October 20 that Col. Ralph E. Vandervort, Jr., will retire from the U.S. Army on October 31.

It is with deep regret that I note this action. For the past 6 years I have consulted on many occasions with Colonel Vandervort on problems dealing with the military establishments in South Dakota and in my capacity as a member of the Defense Department Subcommittee on Appropriations. He has always been most cooperative and efficient in the handling of the problems which I have placed in his hands.

His good services are going to be missed by members of the Congress and I am sure the Department of Defense is going to miss this good emissary which represented them on Capitol Hill. Colonel Vandervort has been a good and valued friend and a dedicated public servant. I wish him the best of success in his future endeavors.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, in August 1961, the Senate was asked to confirm the appointment of the then newly appointed Adjutant General of West Virginia, Gene H. Williams, in the grade of brigadier general as a reserve of the Army.

Questions were raised within the Senate and elsewhere at that time as to the qualifications of General Williams for the appointment.

The Senate Armed Services Committee, recognizing that the position of

State Adjutant General is an administrative rather than a line assignment, gave its advice and consent that General Williams' appointment be approved. Approval was granted on August 16, 1961.

Against this background of the events surrounding this action by the Senate, I have the honor and the pleasure to report that the confidence expressed by both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate as a whole in General Williams' character and ability has been more than justified.

In the 4 years since his appointment, General Williams has performed outstanding service in carrying out a major armory construction program, in administering the mobilization of the largest combat force of the West Virginia Army National Guard, and in bringing to fruition a project to greatly improve the training of Army National Guard Special Forces units, nationwide.

Under General Williams' direction, a total of 30 armories and armory-related structures have been completed, greatly increasing the resources available to West Virginia Army and Air National Guard units in achieving greater readiness status.

When President Kennedy found it necessary to mobilize forces in response to Soviet threats against Berlin, in 1961, one of the major units ordered into Federal service was the 150th Armored Cavalry Regiment of the West Virginia Army National Guard. The performance of this organization throughout its year of Federal service reflected creditably upon the soundness of the support and administrative procedures provided by General Williams' office during the transition period from State to Federal status.

General Williams and his staff successfully administered the return of the 150th Armored Cavalry from Federal to State status, and the necessary reconstitution of the regiment following discharge of men whose term of service had expired. Today, the 150th Armored Cavalry has returned to, and exceeded the level of readiness that it held at the time of its mobilization.

Most significant of all, General Williams recognized early the importance of providing extensive and realistic training areas for the special forces units then being expanded to cope with guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare.

Thanks to his initiative, a State special forces camp, with access to some 600 square miles of ideal training areas is now nearing completion after 4 years of active planning and supervision by General Williams personally, and his staff.

As a result of this outstanding work, not only the West Virginia Army National Guard, but the Special Forces of the entire Active Army, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve, nationwide, will be provided with a training facility ideally suited to the types of terrain in which they possibly may be employed.

In the course of this work, General Williams has taken the time to complete successfully the resident course of instruction at the U.S. Army Command

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and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., meeting all qualifications since established by the Senate Armed Services Committee for granting of Federal recognition to State adjutants general.

The record made by General Williams in the 4 years since his name came before the Senate gives ample demonstration of the vigor and vitality, not only of the State-administered National Guard system in West Virginia, but of the National Guard system in the Nation as a whole.

I welcome this opportunity to publicly commend General Williams for the diligence, initiative and demonstrated ability that has characterized his administration as the adjutant general of West Virginia, and for the manner in which he has thereby justified the faith placed in him by the Senate.

WEST VIRGINIA STATE COLLEGE STUDENTS SUPPORT U.S. ACTION IN VIETNAM

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a statement that I have made, relating to and commending the action of 1,800 students at West Virginia State College at Institute, for endorsing the present Vietnam policy in a letter to President Lyndon B. Johnson.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The statement is as follows:

The letter to President Johnson signed by 1,800 West Virginia State College students in support of U.S. policy in Vietnam was a demonstration of civic responsibility which brings honor to their school and our State.

This spontaneous and orderly action by the majority is in sharp contrast to those staged demonstrations by the few students in other schools in other States who were duped and manipulated by what J. Edgar Hoover terms, "trained agents and provocateurs of the Communist Party."

To my knowledge, there have been no such staged anti-Vietnam demonstrations at any West Virginia school or college. Our State can be proud of that fact, too.

I believe in the administration's policy in South Vietnam. I have said this over and over again. We must fight to contain communism on that line in southeast Asia. For if we do not do it there, we will be fighting a war on a broader front and nearer home.

THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, despite the enormous public relations efforts of the Office of Economic Opportunity, I feel that much of the press of our Nation has been very helpful in giving the public an accurate report on the questionable success of this program throughout the country.

If one were to only listen to Office of Economic Opportunity Director Sargent Shriver you would think the administration's entire poverty program was one of complete success, totally free of administrative error or mismanagement.

The public knows only too well this is not the case. For example, the Chicago Tribune has shown exceptional diligence

and public service in seeing to it that their pages include not only Sargent Shriver's announcements and pronouncements but also the legitimate and well-founded complaints of mismanagement and poor administration. I think the Tribune should be commended for its efforts. As an example of its thorough reporting on the poverty program, I ask unanimous consent to place an article by Mary Pakenham of the Chicago Tribune of Sunday, September 5, 1965, covering the efforts of Senators MURPHY and PROUTY to keep politics out of the poverty program by placing key employees under the political prohibitions provided by the Hatch Act.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GOP FIGHTS POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY POVERTY PROGRAM WORKERS—WANTS EMPLOYERS TO BE COVERED BY HATCH ACT

(By Mary Pakenham)

WASHINGTON, September 4.—Senate Republicans are massing for a last-ditch attempt to keep politics out of the program covered by the administration's new anti-poverty bill. The Chicago Tribune learned today.

House-Senate conferees agreed Thursday night on a \$1,785,000,000 final version of the authorization bill. It is expected to come to a vote in both chambers this week, unless the Senate forces succeed in having it sent back into conference.

The Democratic majority in the conference struck from the bill an amendment extending the 1939 Hatch Act to cover federally paid employees in the Office of Economic Opportunity's community action and domestic Peace Corps programs.

LETTERS FROM MACY

The Hatch Act, entitled "an act to prevent pernicious political activities," forbids partisan political activity on the part of anyone on the public payroll. Tens of thousands of community action programs employees and a growing number of domestic Peace Corps volunteers would have been affected.

At the time the conference committee was considering the amendment it had before it a letter from John W. Macy, Jr., chief of the Civil Service Commission and President Johnson's personal talent scout, urging that Congress allow the anti-poverty staff to engage in politics.

Ever since the so-called war on poverty got under way last November, the political potential of workers in these categories has been a key target for critics.

DESIGNED FOR POLITICS

Each such worker is in a position to earn the gratitude of large numbers of the poor and undereducated, dispensing aid under the aegis of the party in power. That, politicians agree, is the stuff good precinct workers are made of.

In many cases, community action programs have been specifically designed to organize residents of given poverty areas into political pressure groups.

Complaints already have been heard from Mississippi and from cities including Syracuse, N.Y., that anti-poverty workers taking part in voter registration drives have failed to distinguish between the democratic process and the Democratic party.

HEADED BY POWELL

Senators in the forefront of the effort to combat this situation will include WINSTON L. PROUTY, Republican, of Vermont, and GEORGE MURPHY, Republican, of California, coauthors of the stricken amendment. PROUTY was a member of the conference committee, which was headed by Representa-

tive ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, Democrat, of New York.

"The Democratic members of the conference committee," PROUTY told the Tribune, "struck a blow on behalf of every Democratic ward heeler and political flunky in America when they threw the MURPHY-PROUTY political activity amendment into the ash can."

Other Republican conferees said they were shocked by what they called undue interference by Macy.

"The commission believes," Macy wrote, "that it would be unwise to extend the general political activity restrictions of the Hatch Act to such a sizable group of persons in the private sector of community life."

"OPENS PANDORA'S BOX"

Murphy said Macy's letter and the conferees' action on the amendment "opened a Pandora's box of political chicanery."

"On top of the supersalaries, supergrades, and supersalesmanship that have characterized the poverty program," Murphy said, "we now see the administration has stepped in to add superpressure."

"I have always understood the function of the Civil Service Commission to be that of administering the civil service system and not of lobbying or parroting the views of Shriver (OEO Director Sargent Shriver) forces at the OEO."

HEADED BY SHRIVER

PROUTY said he also will try to restore to the bill a Senate amendment which would have strengthened the role of the National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity.

The Council, as established last year, has a maximum membership of 15 persons appointed by the President and is headed by Shriver. The amendment would have prohibited the Director of the OEO from serving as Council chairman.

CAN OUR EARTH FEED ITS PEOPLE?

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, 17 years ago, in 1948, a young member of the Walters, Okla., Future Farmers of America Chapter won his State's FFA oratorical contest with a speech entitled "Can Our Earth Feed Its People?" In that speech, the young man pointed out:

The problem of world food production is no temporary crisis, but a permanent world problem. * * * The people of the world can no longer afford poor, wasteful, and destructive agricultural practices if they are to survive.

What a great experience it must have been for members of the Future Farmers of America attending their national convention in Kansas City, Mo., Friday, October 15, to hear that same former FFA boy, FRED R. HARRIS, now the distinguished U.S. Senator from Oklahoma, deliver another speech of great significance for America and American agriculture.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that both speeches by the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. HARRIS], his FFA speech in 1948, and his most recent address to the national FFA Convention, be inserted in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the speeches were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CAN OUR EARTH FEED ITS PEOPLE?

(Address by Senator FRED R. HARRIS in 1948)

Do you realize that, unless soil erosion and destructive farming methods are overcome, population may outstrip the supply of food?

More than 100 years ago Malthus, an English economist and sociologist, predicted that

TELL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE TRUTH

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, a great newspaper chain—Scripps-Howard—has as its masthead on the editorial page the slogan:

Give light and the people will find their way.

This is very true.

Referring to this slogan leads me to denounce a present Defense Department policy and that of top officials of the executive branch of our Government. In changing the policy heretofore followed in reporting casualties—dead and wounded—in our conflict in Vietnam, information is being denied the American people. I refer to accurate information to which they are entitled. I denounce the present policy of reporting light losses or moderate losses. This is as misleading as is the statement regarding some Air Force strike or battle and then reporting 128 Vietcong dead or some other estimate of Vietcong dead. Those of us who served in World War II recall reports of the number of enemy killed in action and know that some of those reports were subject to 90-percent discount to give them accuracy. American people should be accurately informed by official statements issued at least once a month informing them of the total number of American killed, wounded, and taken prisoner in that period.

Of course, I am not advocating that at the end of each battle or airstrike we report anything other than that losses were light or moderate. Giving complete detailed information at that time might be of aid to the enemy.

The American people are entitled to know the extent of the loss of life in the fighting in southeast Asia to which we are committed and intend to see through to ultimate victory or cease fire or armistice sustaining the integrity and independence of South Vietnam. Furthermore, they can take it, as the saying goes. I am not proposing that following each battle or airstrike, when some of our planes are shot down or casualties incurred, that we immediately disclose those casualties at the time. This might give information to the enemy which would be to our prejudice.

Our President and officials in the Defense Department should however issue an accurate news release at the end of this month, informing the American people fully as to the total killed in action, the total wounded in action, and the total taken prisoner during the month of October. Then, this policy should be followed each month hereafter.

I urge this. I ask that an announcement that such policy will be followed be issued from top officials of the executive branch of our Government, and without delay.

TYPICAL SMALL BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN THE EXPLORATION OF INNER SPACE

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, the dramatic nature of experiments and exploration in the limitless realm of outer space has captivated the American

people to the point where regrettably very limited attention has been given equally significant efforts to expand knowledge of an area in what might be termed "inner space."

In more prosaic fashion, bold and imaginative endeavors have been in progress during recent years to unravel secrets of an equally important aspect of man's environment, the vast expanse of undersea regions of the globe on which we exist. By virtue of the fact that much of this effort is technological and attempted primarily through scientific and engineering instruments, the element of suspense and fascination with persevering and often hazardous exposures of human beings has been missing.

Recently three teams of venturesome individuals dubbed "aquanauts" completed unprecedented research off the southern California coast with an oceanographic operation centered on Sea Lab II. Over a period of a month, dedicated personnel ascertained the possibility of living and working for prolonged periods at considerable depth. The effects of submerged environment were measured carefully in a variety of novel experiments.

The desire to obtain first-hand personally gained knowledge in the underwater realm presents unique problems. One of the most perplexing stems from limitations of visibility and necessitates employment of artificial aids of unique character.

I have been informed that a small engineering-manufacturing firm in California made a contribution of tremendous value to the success of the Sea Lab II undertaking and I believe the American people would be interested in the role played by Birns & Sawyer Cine Equipment Co.

In order to carry on underwater photography and to expand the area of human observation, artificial illumination was essential. Experience quickly demonstrated the inadequacy of most common underwater lights generally utilized near the surface. Customary equipment proved disappointing at the lower levels, extending to a depth of 205 feet. Working life of usual lights for some reason was extremely limited and the process of replacing burned-out bulbs was both time consuming and costly.

After many exasperations, unusual lighting equipment perfected by Birns & Sawyer, a Los Angeles firm, was put to use. The lights lasted a much longer time. When bulbs eventually burned out, replacement was simple since the act could be accomplished inside Sea Lab itself in a matter of minutes, instead of sending a diver down from the surface or raising the equipment to topside.

The experience was a grueling test and the performance a most reassuring accomplishment. It is most gratifying that a small company with only 47 employees contributed so significantly to the success of the venturesome undertaking. Equally pleasing is the fact that the development of the equipment did not entail any expenditure of public funds as no research or development

money from Federal sources was spent in conceiving and producing the lighting apparatus.

I believe this accomplishment is a notable tribute to the imagination and competence of a typical small business enterprise and merits an expression of gratitude on behalf of mankind.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, with the proviso that I do not lose my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, once again I shall have to do a little backtracking. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PROXMIER in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may retain the floor, yield 10 minutes to the distinguished junior Senator from Kentucky (Mr. MORTON), and then propose another quorum call, which will be a "live" quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Kentucky.

PROMOTION OF SMEAR CAMPAIGN BY NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Mr. MORTON. Mr. President, I would like to address myself briefly today to a matter which involves the good name and the integrity of both our great political parties.

As a Republican, I jealously guard the good name of my own party and its leaders. I believe my friends on the other side of the aisle do the same with respect to theirs. For that reason, I believe that my Democratic colleagues have as much interest in the matter I have in mind as do I.

I gave this matter my first public attention during a speech I delivered in Cleveland last week. That speech, incidentally, was given in connection with a series of dinners across the country honoring a great Republican and a great former President, Gen. Dwight David Eisenhower.

At that time I expressed amazement that the national headquarters of the Democratic Party was using its money and its influence to promote a smear against some of our most honored citizens, General Eisenhower among them. I cited a three-volume blacklist prepared by an organization known as Group Research, Inc., which professes to maintain a vigilant watch over—and I am quoting—"extremists of all shades who threaten American democracy."

During those remarks in Cleveland, I also drew attention to the fact that this list of dangerous extremists who are threatening our country carries the name

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proposed plan of development. Land required for administrative sites, campgrounds, rights-of-way for access, and other similar purposes is not covered by this provision. It is not the intent of the committee, as the language of the bill makes clear, that the authority to waive acquisition shall be exercised in favor of development plans—subdivisions, for instance—which will not serve the needs of the general public or the Government.

At the subcommittee hearing, concern was expressed on behalf of holders of patented mining claims within one of the units of the proposed national recreation area, that language in the bill might be construed as indicating that permits for use of national forest land adjacent to, or so located as to be needed in connection with the operation of, the mining claims could no longer be issued. The committee wishes to make clear that nothing in the bill is intended to change the authority for, or prohibit the issuance of, permits to make such use of national forest land in the national recreation area, subject to reasonable conditions, including those that may be appropriate to lessen the adverse effects of the mining operations on the recreational and esthetic values, taking into consideration that effective utilization of mineral and other resources of the area may properly be made.

COST.

Section 10 of the bill limits the amount authorized to be appropriated for land acquisition and for development of recreation facilities to \$21,600,000 and \$22,700,000, respectively. Nearly 59 percent of the costs which are expected to be incurred during the first 5 years of the program will be connected with the Whiskeytown unit, 28 percent with the Clair Engle-Lewiston unit, and 15 percent with the Shasta unit. Should the amounts authorized to be appropriated prove to be insufficient, whether because of rising land prices or for other reasons, the departments concerned will have to seek additional authorization. The committee points out that a substantial part of the development costs of the area might well be incurred even if H.R. 797 were not included, since the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior already have authority to install certain recreation facilities at the reservoirs covered by the bill.

ADDITIONAL FUNDS TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 911, Senate Resolution 154.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The resolution will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A resolution (S. Res. 154) providing additional funds to investigate juvenile delinquency.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the present consideration of the resolution?

There being no objection, the resolution (S. Res. 154) was considered and agreed to, as follows:

S. RES. 154

Resolved, That S. Res. 52, Eighty-ninth Congress, agreed to February 8, 1965 (authorizing an investigation of juvenile delinquency), is hereby amended on page 3, line 1, by striking out "\$220,000.00" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$240,000.00".

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 925), explaining the purposes of the resolution.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Senate Resolution 154 would increase by \$20,000, from \$220,000 to \$240,000, the expenditure authorization of Senate Resolution 52, agreed to February 8, 1965, for use by the Committee on the Judiciary (acting through its Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency) from February 1, 1965, through January 31, 1966 "to examine, investigate, and make a complete study of any and all matters pertaining to juvenile delinquency in the United States, including (a) the extent and character of juvenile delinquency in the United States and its causes and contributing factors; (b) the adequacy of existing provisions of law, including chapters 402 and 403 of title 18 of the United States Code, in dealing with youthful offenders of Federal laws; (c) sentences imposed on, or other correctional action taken with respect to, youthful offenders by Federal courts; and (d) the extent to which juveniles are violating Federal laws relating to the sale or use of narcotics."

During the 2d session of the 88th Congress the Committee on the Judiciary was authorized to expend \$211,000 for the same purposes.

PRINTING OF ADDITIONAL COPIES OF HEARINGS OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate Concurrent Resolution 62.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The resolution will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 62) to authorize the printing of additional copies of the hearings held by the Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs during the 89th Congress, 1st session, on S. 9, the cold war GI education bill.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the present consideration of the concurrent resolution?

There being no objection, the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 62) was considered and agreed to, as follows:

S. CON. RES. 62

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there be printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare two thousand additional copies of the hearings held by its Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs during the Eighty-ninth Congress, first session, on S. 9, a bill to provide readjustment assistance to veterans who serve in the Armed Forces during the induction period.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 912), explaining the purposes of the concurrent resolution.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Senate Concurrent Resolution 62 would authorize the printing for the use of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of 2,000 additional copies of the hearings held by its Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs during the 89th Congress, 1st session, on S. 9, a bill to provide readjustment assistance to veterans who serve in the Armed Forces during the induction period (the cold war GI education bill).

The printing cost estimate, supplied by the Public Printer, is as follows:

Printing cost estimate

Back to press, first 1,000 copies.....	\$2,146.84
1,000 additional copies, at \$513.03 per thousand.....	513.03

Total estimated cost, S. Con.

Res. 62.....	2,659.87
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PRINTING ADDITIONAL COPIES OF HEARINGS ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate Concurrent Resolution 63.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The concurrent resolution will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 63) providing additional copies of hearings on antitrust and monopoly.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the present consideration of the concurrent resolution?

There being no objection, the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 63) was considered and agreed to, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there be printed for the use of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary two thousand additional copies of volume 2 and volume 3 of the hearings held by its Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly during the Eighty-ninth Congress, first session, on economic concentration.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 913), explaining the purposes of the resolution.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Senate Concurrent Resolution 63 would authorize the printing for the use of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary of 2,000 additional copies each of volumes 2 and 3 of the hearings on economic concentration held by its Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly during the 89th Congress, 1st session.

The printing cost estimate, supplied by the Public Printer, is as follows:

Printing cost estimate

Pt. 2:	
Back to press, 1st 1,000 copies.....	\$2,449
1,000 additional copies, at \$803 per thousand.....	803

Estimated cost, pt. 2.....	3,252
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Pt. 3:	
2,000 additional copies, at \$557 per thousand.....	1,114

Estimated cost, pt. 3.....	1,114
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Total estimated cost, S. Con.

Res. 62.....	4,366
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ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it was agreed that the Senate would start on the nominations at 10:30, but I am glad to yield briefly to the senior Senator from Ohio.

In the third section of "The Ombudsman: Citizen's Defender," the editor presents some current proposals. One of these is sponsored by Congressman HENRY S. REUSS, Democrat, of Wisconsin, who urges the creation of an administrative counsel of the Congress to take some of the load of constituent complaints from Congressmen's shoulders, thereby permitting more time to be devoted to the consideration of legislation. The staff of an administrative counsel could develop an expertise which would enhance the efficiency and efficacy of representatives to the executive branch. Besides providing more boon and less boggle, the administrative counsel might be able to pinpoint trouble-spots whose manifestations today are diffused in the offices of 100 Senators and 435 Representatives.

Finally, Professor Rowat has collected 10 short essays in a concluding section designed to "present some of the arguments for and against transplanting the institution."

Ombudsman countries range in population from New Zealand's 2,500,000 inhabitants to Sweden's 7,500,000. Would the office be able to function if there were 18 million potential customers (Canada, California, or New York), or if there were 50 million (Great Britain), or 190 million (the United States)?

The New Zealand ombudsman has testified that with additional staff assistance he could handle four times his present workload, which is somewhat in excess of 1,000 complaints a year. In Sweden, the civil ombudsman, the deputy civil ombudsman, and the military ombudsman have recently combined forces to allow for more rational distribution of cases. Though not raised in the book under review, it might also be argued that there is a minimum size—perhaps under 500,000—below which a city or state has small need for an ombudsman, due to the accessibility of its political leaders.

Must the population in question be homogeneous, as are those in Scandinavia and New Zealand? Would the implementation of an ombudsman office keep us from attacking more serious problems of public administration?

To resolve these doubts, "the best test is a practical trial, preferably as a limited and reversible experiment," according to Prof. Fritz Morstein Marx' essay. In this vein, but independently of the Rowat study, Prof. G. V. V. Nicholls has secured the cooperation of the government of Nova Scotia in permitting the law students at Dalhousie University to serve as unofficial ombudsmen—a form of legal aid in the administrative sphere.

Further scholarly research might also be useful. For example, legislators sometimes argue that they are already functioning as ombudsmen. Yet no systematic investigation has ever been made of complaint-handling procedures, or of the number and kind of grievances which enter an elected official's office, whether in the executive or legislative branch. A study in this domain is being carried out by the Institute of Governmental Studies on the Berkeley campus of the University of California. Such inquiry is valuable whether or not an ombudsman office is instituted, because it permits an appraisal of the adequacy of existing complaint machinery.

The trouble with the lawmaker-as-ombudsman approach is that some legislators are more able, more interested, and more influential than others. At the State level, many citizens are not aware of this avenue of complaint. In my opinion, the availability of elected officials as buffers between citizen and bureaucracy ought to be widely publicized, particularly if politicians insist upon a monopoly.

Throughout the Western World, legislatures have been declining in importance vis-a-vis the executive. The underlying rea-

son may be found in the vast complexity of modern life, which provides the experts of the executive branch with an automatic fait accompli. Even as to grievances, lawmakers reply greatly on executive agencies for the evaluation of complaints which legislators receive. To restore the balance, legislatures need to create tightly knit highly qualified counterparts of administrative mammoths. Praiseworthy efforts in this direction may be seen in Congress Joint Economic Committee, in Federal and State comptrollers general, and more generally in the professionalization of staff assistance for Congressmen and State legislators, their committees and reference libraries. There has, however, been little professionalization of the complaint-handling function.

The Rowat book, then, is timely and provocative. But if the ombudsman idea is going to be more than words, it will have to burst the confines of academic speculation and be tested in one or more of our 50 State "laboratories." Success in Scandinavia and New Zealand would seem to justify the experiment: the ombudsman has served as a homeopathic cure for some of the common ailments of bureaucracy—slowness, rudeness, obtuseness and error—and proved to be a prompt, inexpensive and flexible means of helping to keep administration prompt, inexpensive and flexible.

WHY THE COMMUNISTS KEEP FIGHTING

(Mr. OTTINGER (at the request of Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, last weekend we witnessed a shocking spectacle as the antidraft movement reached a new peak with demonstrations all over the country. These latest demonstrations are shocking not only because many of the demonstrators are violating a new Federal law by destroying their draft cards, but also because the demonstrators—supposedly well-informed, well-educated college students—are demonstrating incredible ignorance about the situation in Vietnam.

I want to make it clear that I firmly believe in the right of assembly. I believe in the right of free speech. I believe in the right of assembly. But I also believe in the law, and those who are breaking and perverting it by destroying draft cards and seeking to undermine the Selective Service Act are a disgrace to this great Nation and should be punished to the fullest extent of the law.

The tragedy of these demonstrations against U.S. policy in Vietnam is that they are having an effect directly contrary to that which apparently is desired. The demonstrators, most of them misguided and uninformed youths, are not promoting peace but postponing it. They are not convincing President Johnson and the Congress that we should terminate our commitment in Vietnam. But they are misleading the Communist leaders in southeast Asia into believing that the antiwar demonstrations will eventually force the administration into pulling out of Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, I suggest in all seriousness that if these young demonstrators really want the fighting in Vietnam to end, they should take their placards and signs to the Communist capitals, for

there lies the ultimate responsibility for the continued bloodshed. The demonstrators must awake from their naivete. They must realize that not only are they playing right into the hands of the Communists, but are in many cases actually being led and controlled by Communists.

Back in January, I was gravely concerned over the situation in Vietnam and the lack of any clear definition of our policy in southeast Asia. I was among the first to call upon President Johnson to enunciate our goals and aspirations in that strife-torn corner of the globe, and to take the initiative in seeking an honorable, peaceful settlement of the conflict. Beginning with his speech at Johns Hopkins University, the President has done just that, but all our overtures have fallen on deaf ears in Hanoi and Peiping. Let there be no doubt who is prolonging the fighting in Vietnam. If our young demonstrators do have doubts, they would do better to spend their time in the classrooms and libraries getting the facts, rather than creating the illusion that they can force our Government to end its commitment in Vietnam and permit another Communist puppet state to be born.

This is not to say that our policy in southeast Asia should not be subject to full and open discussion. Certainly, no phase of our foreign policy is sacrosanct and beyond question. But we are now committed to spare no effort in seeking a just peace and the antidraft and get-out-of-Vietnam movements are having no effect other than to hinder those efforts. By their lack of responsibility and disrespect for the law, the demonstrators are putting this country in a disgraceful and dangerous position.

We cannot escalate the military conflict, as the radical right would have us do, to the point where a world war and nuclear holocaust would be likely, but neither can we abandon the people of South Vietnam and the freedom-loving countries of the world who rely on our strength to protect them from Communist domination, as the radical left and the antidraft demonstrators advocate.

NELSON CRUIKSHANK

(Mr. BURTON of California (at the request of Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BURTON of California. Mr. Speaker, on October 1 of this year, Nelson Cruikshank retired from the post as director, department of social security, AFL-CIO. Nelson Cruikshank is an eloquent and forceful fighter whose efforts span the development of the social security system in the United States from its inception to the most recent enactment of medicare. The bill we passed this year bears the mark of his efforts.

His long and distinguished career started as director, social service department of Brooklyn, N.Y., Federation of Churches. He had worked his way through Ohio Wesleyan University and Union Theological Seminary by working

His plan provides for no direct access to the ombudsman by citizens, as in the Scandinavian countries. All matters would have to come through the offices of Congressmen and Senators. The answers would go back to the inquiring citizens by the same route.

REUSS said his office spends about half its time serving these needs of constituents. An ombudsman, he argues, "would let the Congressman concentrate on central issues in domestic and foreign policy, and he could vote more wisely."

[From the Congressional Quarterly, Editorial Research Reports, Oct. 14, 1965]

AN AMERICAN OMBUDSMAN

(By Richard Spong)

An idea which has been kicking around the U.S. Congress without much attention for the past several years is certain to be given another and more studious look when Britain's Parliament approves legislation establishing the new office of Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration. This is the British version of the Scandinavian Ombudsman, who is charged with investigating and pressing citizens' complaints against the government and public officials.

Several measures to create an American Ombudsman have been introduced in recent sessions of Congress. Senator CLABORNE PELL, Democrat of Rhode Island and Representative HENRY S. REUSS, Democrat of Wisconsin are sponsors of measures (S. 984, H.R. 4273) pigeonholed in committees at present that would establish what they call an administrative counsel of the Congress.

This individual, in the language of Representative REUSS, "shall review the case of any person who alleges that he believes that he has been subjected to any improper penalty, or that he has been denied any right or benefit to which he is entitled under the laws * * * or that the determination or award of any such right or benefit has been * * * unreasonably delayed."

The Ombudsman has proved a successful device for democratic government in Sweden, where it was established in 1809. Since then it has spread to other countries, to Finland in 1919, Japan in 1948, Denmark in 1955, and Norway and New Zealand in 1962.

Now the British Labor Government, in a white paper of October 12, proposes the establishment of a Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration who would be an Ombudsman with a special British complexion. He would be entirely independent of the government, but—and the point is important—the public would make its complaints through Members of Parliament. "In Britain," the white paper explains, "Parliament is the place for ventilating the grievances of the citizen—by history, tradition, and past and present practice." It's also good politics for M.P.'s to handle the chores of their constituents.

Most British papers welcomed the Ombudsman proposal. The Times reasoned sedately: "The development of the French Conseil d'Etat and the Scandinavian Ombudsman shows that such institutions are capable of becoming not merely valuable means of redress but a positive influence, making for competent and fair administration—an assistance not an impediment to officialdom."

But the Daily Express sees the proposal as just another Labor gimmick, arguing: "Parliament, the press, and the judiciary are well able to look after the rightful interests of the public. If the Ombudsman emerged as a serious rival for the protection of the public interest there might be a danger that the traditional safeguards of the people would be undermined."

In a welfare state the British Ombudsman will have plenty of complaints, though nationalized industry is to be off limits for him—along with local government, judicial proceedings, and military and foreign affairs.

A congressional Administrative Counsel would be equally busy.

An American Ombudsman would lighten the "casework" load of Senators and Representatives and still—by handling only complaints funneled through Capitol Hill—leave the flow of political power undisturbed. Representative REUSS, in testimony before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress some time ago (May 11, 1965) soberly observed: "I do not believe that Members of Congress, who want to be reelected, would consent to remove themselves entirely from dealing with constituents' problems."

In a radio broadcast on October 14, 1965, David Brinkley argued for an American ombudsman, albeit one whose role would be somewhat different from what I have envisioned. The script of his broadcast follows:

The British and four other countries have, or will have, somebody in the Government citizens can write to and get answers. We could use one here. Back in a moment.

Sweden has had for 150 years a public official called an ombudsman. His job is to accept complaints from the citizens about their dealings with the government, investigate, see if they have any substance, and if they do, take some action. Now the British are adopting the idea. Finland, Denmark, and New Zealand already have, and it is occasionally recommended that the United States try it. If we did, the results surely would be interesting, because it appears that you can scratch any American and find somebody with a complaint, a question, a suggestion, or a criticism he wants to take up with the Government. And if we were to have an ombudsman, all of these would immediately fall into his lap.

Where they fall now are in the White House mailroom and on the desks of Congressmen, Government officials, newspaper and broadcast reporters. Most of them are in two categories: Questions and complaints about social security payments, generally from those who think they ought to be getting more and questions and complaints about veterans' benefits, generally from those who think they ought to be getting more. Plus the other Government welfare programs where people think they have had a bad deal. And with all the new welfare plans now going into effect—medical care and the others—this kind of complaint is bound to increase. Complaints sent to the White House are routinely referred to the agencies involved: Social Security, Veterans' Administration, the Health and Welfare Department. And, eventually, they will answer. But the agency answering the complaint is the same agency being complained about, so it is unlikely the answer will say anything the writer has not already heard. Complaints to Congress get roughly the same treatment. All congressional offices are understaffed for this kind of thing. They have neither the people nor the time to make personal investigations of complaints about veterans and social security payments. So they ask the agencies involved for the answers, pass them along in their own replies, and that's about all they can do.

In addition, there are always those who want their poems printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD or broadcast on the Voice of America, those with plans for saving the world, paying off the debt, and other good ideas that, regrettably, appear unworkable. If there were a Federal Government ombudsman, a sort of national Mister Fixit, all this would go to him. He would have to have the power to force the right answers out of the bureaucrats, keep a tabulated record of the complaints so he could detect unusual centers of bungling and incompetence in the Federal Establishment and help repair them and so perform a service both to the public

and to the Government. The bigger the Government gets, and it grows every day, the more complaints there will be and the less chance of getting adequate answers. So, sometime, we may come to it, somebody to write to in the Government who can and will do something. As for the poems and the plans for saving the world, he could just send them back with a polite note.

In addition, I include a very thoughtful review of a new book on the ombudsman edited by Prof. Donald C. Rowat of the University of Toronto and entitled, "The Ombudsman: Citizen's Defender," University of Toronto, 1965. The reviewer Prof. Stanley V. Anderson of the University of California at Santa Barbara is one of the leading experts on the ombudsman. He is a professor of political science and a lawyer.

[From the New Republic, October 23, 1965]

COMPLAINT DEPARTMENT

(By Stanley V. Anderson)

The ombudsman is an independent commissioner appointed by the legislature to investigate citizens' complaints of bureaucratic abuse. He has the power to compel testimony, the duty to form an opinion, and the right to publish his views. He does not have power to change an administrative decision nor to punish civil servants other than by reprimand.

As a result of ombudsmanic inquiries, the administration may choose to alter a previous position or to subject an employee to disciplinary proceedings. The former is common, the latter rare. In either case, the authorities act because they are persuaded by the reasonableness of the ombudsman's views, and not because they are bound by his judgments. Equally important, an agency may revise a troublesome regulation or the legislature may amend an unworkable law, pursuant to the ombudsman's suggestion.

Sweden provided for a Justitiebudsman (JO)—literally, an "agent for justice"—in the constitution of 1809. Finland, for centuries a part of the Swedish kingdom, followed suit in 1919 after breaking ties with Russia. In the decade from 1952 to 1962, the institution was adopted in Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, and West Germany—in the last, for military affairs only. More recently, proposals have been put forward in Australia, Canada, England, Holland, and Ireland. This year, ombudsman bills were dropped in the legislative hoppers of California, Connecticut, Illinois, and New York. Another was introduced in the New York City Council. Gov. Edmund G. Brown accorded the California bill emergency status before it was defeated in the senate committee on government efficiency; the measure is under interim study awaiting reintroduction by Assembly Speaker Jesse M. Unruh.

The literature on Ombudsmen is extensive, but scattered and repetitive. Professor Rowat, chairman of political science at Carleton University in Ottawa, has provided a benchmark by putting 28 articles between two covers. Nearly half of the text explicates existing Ombudsman systems. Next, a few related institutions are described, such as the Army Inspectorate-General and the erstwhile Philippine Presidential Complaints and Action Committee (PCAC). The demise of the latter suggests that the effectiveness of an Ombudsman is limited to marginal defects in administration, and "does not meet the [more basic] need for a rationalization of government power and structure." With a population three times that of Sweden, the PCAC received complaints at a rate of 30 to 1 over the Swedish total of about 2,000 a year.

Small Business Administration disaster loans—the principal form of Federal assistance now available to individual disaster victims.

These SBA home and business rebuilding loans, which carry an interest charge of only 3 percent, can now be offered for a term of no more than 20 years, and only to borrowers who can't qualify for private credit. The Senate bill would extend the maximum loan term to 30 years and, more important, make low-cost SBA credit available to all comers in any area the agency declares to be disaster stricken. (Portions of 38 States have been so designated within the past 18 months.)

"This may take some business away from private mortgage lenders," concedes one of the bill's proponents, "but why should a provident man whose home has been washed away have to pay 6 percent for rebuilding money when his neighbor with a lousy credit rating is only paying 3 percent?"

The Senate bill's provisions for reimbursing property owners for their losses would make the States handle damage claims and require them to put up one-third of the funds. The money would only go out for damage categories against which insurance can't be obtained "at reasonable rates" and total reimbursement would be limited to 75 percent of the amount of a disaster loss. Also, high-risk areas especially vulnerable to repeated flooding would be excluded from coverage; States would have to adopt "floodplain zoning controls" that would rule out such areas.

NO WIND PROTECTION

Thus a man whose \$30,000 home is completely washed away by a flood could qualify for the maximum \$15,000 Federal grant, plus \$7,500 from his State government—provided he hadn't built in an area ruled off limits by his State's flood-zoning plan. If, on the other hand, his home were destroyed by a tornado or by hurricane winds (as contrasted with hurricane waters) there would be no Federal-State reimbursement because he could have obtained private insurance against wind perils. Eligibility of an earthquake victim would depend on the availability and rates for earthquake insurance in his locality.

"We feel we've taken care not to discourage sound business practices in any way," says Senator Bayh. And neither insurers nor mortgage lenders have any great quarrel with his assertion, though the lenders are far from pleased with the bill's broadening of SBA loan eligibility standards.

The insurance industry, for its part, has long agonized over its inability to offer flood insurance and is glad to have protection against the torrent of abuse that invariably follows rejection of mass water damage claims. There are misgivings, to be sure, about just where a Federal intrusion into the indemnity field may ultimately lead. But the Bayh bill, at least in the judgment of insurance industry envoys in Washington, poses no imminent threat.

COULD AID INSURERS LATER

"It doesn't discourage purchase of any form of insurance that's on the market now, and by encouraging the States to develop flood-zoning systems, it could pave the way for making private flood insurance practical," observes one industry man. Should flood zoning ever become refined enough to permit accurate scaling of insurance rates according to flood risks, the Bayh bill is designed to cede jurisdiction back to the industry, at least in lower risk areas.

But what may be good for insurers and money lenders may not represent "sound business practice" for Uncle Sam, some flood control experts suggest.

Average flood and tidal damages of around \$400 million yearly over the past decade, as compiled by the U.S. Weather Bureau, could

soar much higher, the weathermen concede. Even the estimated \$1.9 billion in damages inflicted over the past 12 months—a high water mark—could be dwarfed in a few hours, it's acknowledged, if a wayward hurricane should ever blow into the New York area at full tilt.

Once before, in 1956, Congress authorized creation of a flood indemnity fund, built on an insurance framework under which persons seeking protection would pay 60 percent of the premium, Uncle Sam 20 percent and the States the balance. But the Federal Flood Indemnification Administration, set up to run the program, quickly became mired in ratesetting quarrels. And when it came back to Congress in 1957 for \$500 million just to get the program going, the House Appropriations Committee balked. Without any funding, the program perished.

THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND THE GENEVA CONVENTION

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, not so many months ago, our defeatists and our doomsday criers, as well as our enemies, were telling us that the war in Vietnam could not be won.

Some of them said we could not possibly win, because the French who knew southeast Asia so much better than we do had not been able to win with an army of 500,000 men.

This is an argument which I have always found singularly unimpressive.

Indeed, on the basis of their entire record in Indochina, the French colonialists should be the last ones to be held up as an example or to be asked for advice on how to conduct a counter guerrilla war.

Some said that we could not possibly win because we ourselves were unequipped to fight a guerrilla war in the jungles of Vietnam. But their pessimistic appraisal has been given the lie by the events of recent months in Vietnam.

And there were those who said that we could not possibly win because Hanoi and Peiping were prepared to fight for 10 or 20 years if necessary. They said that Communist regimes are infinitely more stubborn and persevering than democratic governments can ever be, and that these regimes are inherently too proud to admit defeat.

This appraisal of Communist staying power was proved wrong in the Korean war, and it is my conviction that it will again be proved wrong in Vietnam.

Communist pride is a contradiction in terms. The Communists have no pride. They are history's supreme opportunists.

When hard pressed, they have always been willing to call a halt to the battle, even at the cost of important diplomatic concessions.

In the days after the Bolshevik revolution, Lenin lectured some of the more stubborn of his party members on the need for knowing how to take one step back, so that they would at a future date be able to take two steps forward. And, at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin purchased peace with the German Army by major territorial and other concessions.

So it simply is not true that Communists are too proud to back down or to compromise.

When I returned from the Far East last May and reported that the war in Vietnam was going much better than could be gleaned from a reading of the press and that there were many reasons for being sanguine about the future, I was accused by some editors and by some of my colleagues of naivete and wishful thinking. I know that one Senator said on the floor of the Senate later that I did not know what I was talking about.

But today I do not think that anyone will challenge the statement that the war is going very much better for our side.

Virtually all the accounts from Vietnam are now agreed that the much-touted Vietcong monsoon offensive failed to make serious headway; that our side has, by and large, had the better of the Communists in the important engagements that have taken place since last June 1; that morale on the Government side has improved tremendously; and that there are clear signs that the morale of the Vietcong is beginning to crack.

This is the theme of an article in this week's issue of Time magazine, which I ask unanimous consent to insert into the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 3.)

Mr. DODD. I ask unanimous consent that an article entitled "Back to Geneva 1954? An Act of Political Folly" be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, the Time article makes it clear that the vastly improved situation in Vietnam could not possibly have come about without large scale American intervention. But it also underscores the fact that it is the South Vietnamese Army, and not the American forces, that is doing most of the fighting and suffering most of the casualties. And the South Vietnamese forces are now fighting better because, with our assistance, they are now confident of the final outcome of the struggle.

Time points out that in the 4 months after U.S. combat units went into action, some 3,000 Government soldiers were killed compared with 275 Americans. It also points out that, as the U.S. buildup has grown larger, Government losses in action have gone down dramatically—from 1,300 in July, to 800 in August, to 567 in September.

There are many evidences of declining Vietcong morale. Their dead, whom they previously used to remove from the battlefield even at the risk of their lives, are now frequently left on the field of battle in large numbers. Their weapons, which they previously considered far more precious than lives, are now frequently left behind by the retreating Vietcong.

But perhaps the most important single piece of evidence of the declining Vietcong morale is the fact that during the month of September defections from the Vietcong to the Government side reached the all-time high of 1,654. Against this figure, the Vietcong was able to boast of

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ently under consideration we come to the point of recognition by the Federal Government of its obligation to provide some sort of assistance in this field.

Once the HHFA has completed the 9-month study of flood insurance factors and an equivalent study of earthquake insurance factors the Congress will be in a better position to determine what form Federal assistance in this area should take. It may be that the study itself once completed will provide sufficient data for the insurance industry to use in setting up a privately financed program. This, however, does not seem likely as the insurance industry has for many years studied the problem and determined over and over that privately supported flood insurance is financially unfeasible. Thus it may be then that what will come out of this study will be a proposal for a Federal reinsurance or upper limit guarantee which, in the manner pioneered by Federal Housing Administration insured loans, will encourage reasonable flood insurance schemes to be proposed by private industry.

Or, it may be that nothing will induce the industry to establish flood and earthquake insurance programs at reasonable rates. In this case the Federal Government will have no alternative but to establish its own Federal disaster insurance program. If this becomes necessary all that remains is to implement a statute which is already on the books, the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956—Public Law 84-1016. If merited at that time Public Law 84-1016 could be expanded to include earthquake insurance as well.

Those of us who have worked to assure passage of language authorizing and appropriating money for a flood and earthquake insurance study trust that the Housing and Home Finance Agency—incorporated now in the newly created Department of Housing and Urban Development will bend its efforts toward providing for the Congress the most thorough and all-encompassing study of the factors involved in earthquake and flood insurance. Thus, when the report is received, we will be in a position to make an intelligent decision as to what sort of Federal program is needed in this area.

Surely the massive loss of real and personal property which occurs yearly in the United States can, in some measure, be insured against through some sort of federally supported or federally assisted program. The study which H.R. 11539 authorizes is the first necessary step toward this goal.

Mr. President, the Wall Street Journal of June 9 and again of October 18 of this year discussed proposals being considered here in the Congress and elsewhere in the country for a Federal disaster insurance program. These articles will, I am sure, be of interest to the Senate.

I ask unanimous consent that they appear at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal, June 9, 1965]
STATE AIDS BELIEVE ANY FLOOD INSURANCE REQUIRES FEDERAL AID—COMMISSIONERS LIKELY TO SOUND OUT WASHINGTON AS FIRMS ARE RELUCTANT TO HANDLE PROBLEM

NEW YORK.—Any workable program to insure property owners against flood damage will require large-scale Federal participation.

That view appeared to be gaining support among State insurance regulators at the semiannual meeting of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners here, despite wide misgivings among insurers and State officials regarding Federal "encroachments."

An NAIC committee on property and casualty coverages will meet late today and is expected to recommend that the organization schedule conferences in Washington to find out what kind of Government participation might be arranged. It will act on the basis of a report of a subcommittee to which the flood insurance question was assigned more than a year ago.

This report includes the findings of a group of insurance industry representatives who were asked last year to explore the question of private concerns' capabilities in the field of flood coverage. That panel indicated earlier this week that after extensive studies it could make "no recommendations of any specific program for flood insurance on dwelling buildings." That report in effect tossed the problem back into the State officials' laps and left no way out but an indemnification plan based largely on Government aid.

Basically, the view of insurance men is that flood damage is not an insurable risk in the same sense as fire or hurricane losses, in which the premiums paid by many persons provide funds to compensate the relatively few who have losses. It is argued that hardly anyone would buy flood insurance unless he is in a location, such as a river valley or the seashore, where damage would be probable—a situation inconsistent with the insurance principle of risk spreading.

The insurance industry panel said it had considered a mandatory approach, in which all dwelling policies would include a charge for flood coverage, and a plan in which flood coverage would be optional. It said it found neither approach workable "on a feasible business basis."

[From the Wall Street Journal, Oct. 18, 1965]
CONGRESS MULLS A PLAN TO AID FUTURE VICTIMS OF FLOODS, HURRICANES—FEDERAL INSURANCE WOULD GIVE PROPERTY DAMAGE COVERAGE NOT OFFERED BY COMPANIES

(By Joseph W. Sullivan)

WASHINGTON.—Protection for property owners against a major hazard that U.S. insurance companies have never been willing to cover at any price may soon be made available by Uncle Sam, without charge.

The hazard, which already has inflicted damages of well over a billion dollars on U.S. homes, farms, and businesses this year, is water—water propelled by a flooding river, high tide, hurricane or just plain windstorm.

Because these perils are capable of inundating entire communities, insurers blanch at the prospect of paying for their havoc. Moreover, because insurance against them has appeal only in the localities where the peril is greatest, there's little way for an insurer to apply his golden precept of collecting premiums from the many to pay the claims of a few.

These same considerations, however, are serving to spur efforts within the Johnson administration and in Congress to come up with some alternate form of relief payments for the afflicted. For the greater the destruc-

tion, the greater the pressures for the Government to step in and help out. Galvanized by this year's freakish combination of heavy winter and spring flooding in many parts of the West and Hurricane Betsy's more recent devastation of the Louisiana lowlands, congressional majorities are plainly prepared to start the relief funds flowing, though the form, size and exact timing of help are still in doubt.

FEDERAL INDEMNITY PAYMENTS

Creation of a federally subsidized disaster insurance program in which property owners would pay some premium to get protection, is one possibility getting consideration. Most of the attention, though, centers on providing unadorned Government indemnity payments for home and business losses in designated disaster areas.

"Private property owners have no effective way to protect themselves against the worst forms of natural calamity, and the Federal Government is the only entity with the resources to step in and fill the void," declares an official of the Federal Office of Emergency Planning. The OEP figures to spend close to \$100 million this year to help clean away flood and storm debris, restore public facilities and services and provide emergency housing to disaster victims; but under present law it can't do anything about compensating private losses.

As a starter in that direction, the House is due to approve today a special "Betsy" bill providing what amounts to Federal grants of up to \$1,800 each to uninsured Louisiana, Florida, and Mississippi residents whose property was damaged or destroyed by the hurricane. The Senate Public Works Committee plans to take up the measure tomorrow and barring some end-of-session mixup it should be enacted by late this week.

BROADER DISASTER RELIEF

The Betsy bill does no more than set a precedent, however, and despite its \$70 million price tag, it's stingy alongside the much broader disaster relief legislation that's being readied to follow. Indeed, after ratifying the Betsy bill last Wednesday, the House Public Works Committee immediately turned its attention to a Senate-passed indemnification bill that would set far higher ceilings on individual payments for all future disasters—\$22,500 in the case of residential damages and \$75,000 for business property. Because nobody has a firm idea how much this scheme might ultimately cost, the House group will probably extend its deliberations on the measure into the new session of Congress that begins in January. Both congressional and administration disaster aid specialists are agreed, though, that some version of the broad relief measure should be enacted soon.

"The simple fact that we have to resort to special, sectional acts of Congress to provide relief to some disaster areas is indication enough that present provisions are inadequate," declares Democratic Senator BRACH BAYH, of Indiana, chief sponsor of the Senate-passed bill. Only by pledging prompt attention to the broad Senate measure were leaders of the House public works unit able to get an assurance from Chairman PAT McNAMARA of the Senate Public Works Committee that he'd take up special aid for Betsy victims.

Actually, indemnification of private property losses is only one feature of the multi-benefit aid plan approved by the Senate with administration backing. The legislation would also commit the Federal Government to picking up the entire tab for reconstruction of storm-damaged schools, highways, sewage works, and other essential public facilities. In addition, it would greatly liberalize eligibility standards and terms of

only 225 Government defections during the previous month of August.

The Vietcong still have a lot of fight in them. But all the indications are that the tide of battle has now turned. Prisoners and defectors both report that recent allied victories have caused the Vietcong to lose much of their cockiness and that continuing offensive action by American and Vietnamese troops and by American and Vietnamese aircraft now make it virtually impossible for them to rest in one place for any period of time. They say that the Vietcong are kept constantly on the move, so that they do not have time to take care of their weapons properly; that they are short of sleep and short of medical supplies and short of food and of other essentials.

The incredible youth of the recent prisoners and defectors is another clue to the desperate situation of the Vietcong. There was a time when the Vietcong relied to a large degree on volunteers. But many of their newly recruited contingents are made up for the most part of 14- and 15-year-old boys who have been conscripted into the Vietcong army against their will and against their parents' will.

There is every reason for believing that over the coming months things will continue to get worse for the Vietcong and will continue to go better for our side.

The American buildup now stands at approximately 150,000. It will soon go to 200,000 men.

The men already in Vietnam may have been raw at the point of arrival; but they are now shaping up into battle-hardened guerrilla veterans.

The cooperation between our Army, Navy, and Air Force is constantly improving, and so is cooperation between our own forces and the Vietnamese armed forces.

The Vietnamese Government under General Ky is shaping up impressively.

Against the background of the growing American buildup in South Vietnam and the deteriorating military position of the Vietcong, there is increasing evidence that the Communists now realize that they cannot win the war and they are therefore seeking to extricate themselves at the conference table, as they were able to extricate themselves from the Korean war through the prolonged conference at Panmunjom.

Needless to say, the Communists hope to achieve at the conference table the victory which has been denied them on the field of battle.

And the formula they have chosen for this is a call for the return to the Geneva Convention of 1954.

I have myself seen at least a dozen broadcasts from Moscow and even from Peking over the past 2 months calling for a return to the Geneva Convention. And only this week the papers announced that the Soviet leaders had issued a joint statement with the Danish Prime Minister, on the conclusion of his visit to Moscow, deploring the war in Vietnam, and calling for its termination through a recommitment to the terms of the Geneva Agreement.

Now it is a pretty good rough rule of thumb that anything the Communists consider good for themselves is almost certainly not good for the free world. But unfortunately so much confusion has been generated about the Geneva Convention that there are many people in our own country—and they are by no means confined to those who oppose the Vietnam war—who are convinced that there would have been no war in Vietnam if we had not encouraged President Diem to violate the Geneva Convention, and who believe that the way to settle the dispute is to return to this formula on which the interested parties had previously agreed.

It is my conviction that the Geneva Agreements were a fraud perpetrated on a still naive and gullible Western World by the Communist powers.

The Communists never intended to abide by the restrictions which the agreements theoretically imposed on them; and the record is overwhelming that the Communists were in violation of the agreements from the first day.

On the other hand, they sought to use the Geneva Agreements to prevent the South Vietnamese Government from defending itself and to compel the integration of the South with the North under terms that could only have led to the communization of the complete country.

COMMUNIST SABOTAGE OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS

The public confusion on the origins of the Vietnamese war stems in large measure from the sabotage by the Communist members of the three-nation International Control Commission set up to supervise the carrying out of the Geneva Agreements.

By 1961, reports of 1,200 offensive incidents by Communist agents, ranging from one-man assassinations to large-scale military actions, had been presented to the Commission.

The Commission, however, took no action because the Polish Communist member consistently refused to investigate reports of North Vietnamese intervention in South Vietnam.

In this way, this entire massive body of evidence of Hanoi's intervention in South Vietnam was muted and rendered ineffective.

Mr. President, during the course of the past summer, I had an exchange of correspondence with Mr. Theodore Beaubien Blockley, a former member of the Canadian foreign service who, in the post-Geneva period, served as senior political adviser to the Canadian Commissioner to the International Control Commission for Vietnam, and as legal counselor to the Canadian Commissioners for Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam. He also served for some period of time as the acting leader of the Canadian delegation in Hanoi.

I was so impressed by what Mr. Blockley had to say about the manner in which the Geneva accords were manipulated and flouted by the Communists, that I asked Mr. Blockley whether he could provide me with a detailed account of his experiences which I might bring to the attention of my colleagues in the Senate.

I felt that this would be particularly valuable, because no member of the International Control Commission has, to my knowledge, heretofore told the inside story.

I hope every Member of the Senate will read the full text of Mr. Blockley's letter. Here is a member of the Control Commission who served in North Vietnam during that period of time, and he now tells us what really went on.

On September 29, Mr. Blockley wrote me a long letter from which I plan to quote extensively in my further remarks. But before I do so, I would like to try to dispel some of the confusion that unfortunately exists about the terms of the Geneva agreement and about the purported violation of the agreement by the South Vietnamese Government and by the United States.

THE TERMS OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS

Insofar as they pertain to Vietnam, there were two items of importance in the group of documents generally referred to as the Geneva Accords, or Geneva Agreements.

The first was an agreement for a military truce signed by the French and the Vietminh. This truce called for the regroupment of the opposing military forces on both sides of the 17th parallel, provided that people wishing to move from one regroupment zone to the other might do so, and established a three-nation International Control Commission to supervise the truce.

This military agreement also placed ceilings and restrictions on the amount and type of military forces and equipment which might be maintained in each zone.

In addition to this truce between the French and Vietminh, there was also a curious document entitled a "Final Declaration" of the Geneva Conference. This document, signed by no person or no nation, called for, among other things, the holding of free elections in July 1956 to establish democratic institutions under which the country might be unified.

It should be clear to even the most inexperienced lawyer that such unsigned declarations bind no one and that unilateral declarations, such as those issued by the United States and the State of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference, have just as much validity, if not more. At least they were signed by someone.

At the final session of the Geneva Conference on Indochina on July 21, 1954, the Vietnamese delegate formally protested "against the hasty conclusions of the armistice agreement by the French and Vietminh high commands only," and against various provisions of the agreement.

He protested particularly "against the fact that the French high command was pleased to take the right, without a preliminary agreement of the delegation of the State of Vietnam, to set the date of further elections."

He concluded by saying:

The Government of the state of Vietnam wished the conference to take note of the fact that it reserves the full freedom of action in order to safeguard the sacred right of the Vietnamese people to territorial unity, national independence, and freedom.

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The United States took the position in its declaration that it would support the Geneva Agreements and would view with concern any attempt to upset them with force.

On the subject of reunification, we maintained we would support the principle of free elections under United Nations supervision.

The South Vietnamese authorities also announced that they would not interfere with the provisions of the Franco-Vietminh truce, but they made it plain that they bitterly resented the artificial division of their country.

But putting aside this question of who agreed to what at Geneva, and putting aside the fact that the final declaration is an obscurely worded document, it is plain that the documents issuing from this conference 10 years ago were quite clear on what sort of elections were to be held in Vietnam. They were to be free elections. And it has been as plain as a pike-staff for the past decade that by no stretch of the imagination could free elections ever have been held in North Vietnam.

Free elections would only have been possible throughout the territory of Vietnam if, over the 2-year period between the Geneva Convention and the proposed date of the elections, there had been complete freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of political organization in the North, as well as the South.

In the South, these conditions were at least met within certain limits.

But in the North the victorious Vietminh regime proceeded immediately to the imposition of a totalitarian Communist regime. The press and radio were taken over by the state. Opposition political organizations were illegalized. Scores of thousands of oppositionists were murdered and hundreds of thousands imprisoned.

You do not, however, have to take my word for the above statements. I want to quote from Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the current Defense Minister of North Vietnam, as he spoke to the 10th Congress of the North Vietnamese Communist Party in October of 1956:

We made too many deviations and executed too many honest people. We attacked on too large a front and, seeing enemies everywhere, resorted to terror, which became far too widespread.

Whilst carrying out our land reform program we failed to respect the principles of freedom of faith and worship in many areas.

When reorganizing the party, we paid too much importance to the notion of social class instead of adhering firmly to political qualifications alone. Instead of recognizing education to be the first essential, we resorted exclusively to organizational measures such as disciplinary punishments, expulsion from the party, executions, dissolution of party branches and cells. Worse still, torture came to be regarded as a normal practice during party reorganization.

So, 3 months after the time that free elections were to be held in Vietnam, we have the spectacle of the North Vietnamese themselves admitting they were running a police state where executions, terror, and torture were commonplace.

Free elections under such circumstances would have been a travesty of the letter as well as the spirit of the final declaration of the Geneva Conference.

I have already made the point that the appendix to the Geneva Convention calling for national elections in 1956 was not legally binding on the government of South Vietnam.

But if one wishes to argue that this clause was binding on both sides, then it is clear that North Vietnam was from the very first in violation of the Geneva Accord on this point because its very first act was to destroy all those political preconditions which might have made free elections possible.

COMMUNISM AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS

There is another matter to which the current advocates of nationwide elections in Vietnam have not, I believe, given adequate consideration.

Their advocacy is generally justified on the grounds that a nationwide election is the only democratic and reasonable manner of settling the Vietnam dispute.

Most of them would, I believe, be prepared to concede that Communists, when they engage in election campaigns or when they seek to win the support of the people in a country or an area they do not yet control, generally masquerade as non-Communists.

Thus the Bolsheviks promised the peasants peace, bread, and land.

The Chinese Communists presented themselves as agrarian reformers.

Ho Chi Minh presented himself as a nationalist, anticolonialist leader.

Fidel Castro pretended to be a constitutionalist democrat in revolt against the Batista dictatorship.

But when they came to power Lenin and Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh and Fidel Castro all dropped their masks, and set about the business of erecting totalitarian Communist states and collectivizing their peasants and terrorizing their subjects.

Neither the people of the Soviet Union nor the people of China nor the people of Vietnam nor the people of Cuba nor the people of any other Communist state ever voted for communism as such or ever gave their support to a movement which promised them communism. They were defrauded—but by the time they discovered that they had been defrauded, it was too late to do anything about it.

I believe that most of those who advocate a nationwide election as a solution for the Vietnam impasse, would also be prepared to concede that, once the Communists establish themselves in power, they do not accord their subjects the option of voting them out of power if they are dissatisfied with their rule.

What they are proposing, in effect, therefore, is that we agree to a one-time election in Vietnam. And if the people of North Vietnam who have been under Communist Party discipline for 12 years are pressured into voting for the Communist slate, and if they are joined by a sufficient number of people in South Vietnam who have been led to believe that they are voting for national inde-

pendence, the result of the election must be considered binding for all time by all countries because, so the argument goes, the Vietnamese people will have opted for communism.

In my opinion, any such one-time election is a travesty on democracy and has absolutely nothing to do with the process of self-determination.

For my own part, I would be prepared to agree to nationwide elections in Vietnam if strong international machinery could be set up to assure the Vietnamese people of complete political democracy for a period of several years after the election, with the understanding that there would be a second election at the end of that time.

I am convinced that in any such second election the people would turn against the Communists in as overwhelming numbers as the Hungarian people turned against their Communist regime. But I am also convinced that no Communist regime would ever or could ever agree to such democratic elections because the Communists also know that such elections would mean the end of communism.

Communist violations of the Geneva Convention were not confined to the establishment of a totalitarian state.

Article 15 of the agreement on Vietnam said that withdrawals of the regular armed forces were to take place without hindrance, destruction, or sabotage of any public property, and without injury to the civilian population. Dr. Frank N. Trager, professor of international affairs at New York University and one of this country's leading experts on southeast Asia, has pointed out in a recent issue of "Vietnam Perspectives":

As a matter of record the withdrawal of the Vietminh forces from the zone of the south was accompanied by considerable looting and destruction of public buildings and railroads, systematic destruction or theft of the files, documents, and especially land registries in the upper provinces close to the 17th parallel, and kidnapping or murder of local officials. But, by contrast to the activity of the irregulars who were left behind, these were transient woes visited upon the Government and the people of South Vietnam.

Professor Trager went on to point out that in 1955 the irregular cadres who have been left behind in South Vietnam were formally organized into the so-called army of liberation and that it was at this early date that the Communists embarked upon their systematic campaign of terror and kidnapping and sabotage and military action disguised as internal revolt against the Government of South Vietnam.

In a memorandum to the Soviet Government in April 1956, the British Government refused to accept the statement that the South Vietnamese authorities had been breaching the military articles of the Geneva agreement, and presented figures to prove that it was in fact North Vietnam which had been breaching the military clauses of the agreement.

Let me quote from this British memorandum for the purpose of helping to

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reestablish some perspective on what really happened:

The Soviet Government was no doubt aware that similar accusations by the Vietminh high command have already been investigated by the International Commission and, as explained in the Commission's fourth and fifth interim reports, shown to be without foundation.

Nor can Her Majesty's government give any credence to the charge of preparation of "military cadres" for the so-called campaign to the north with the aim of starting a new war in Indochina. In this connection Her Majesty's government consider that a comparison of military developments in North and South Vietnam provide the best guide to the attitude and intentions of the authorities in the two zones.

At the time of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, the force at the disposal of the French Union high command in Vietnam amounted to approximately 300,000 men. Since then over 100,000 French troops have been withdrawn and there will soon be none left, while the Vietnamese Army has been reduced by 20,000 men. In North Vietnam, however, there has been no such reduction in military strength since the conclusion of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. On the contrary, the Vietminh Army has been so greatly strengthened by the men and reequipment of irregular forces that, instead of the 7 Vietminh divisions in existence in July 1964 there are now no less than 20. The striking contrast between massive military expansion in the north and the withdrawal and reduction of military forces in the south speaks for itself.

Mr. Blockley, in his letter to me, said that the evidence of espionage, subversion, and sabotage by the North Vietnamese Government was so massive that he was able to get the Legal Committee of the Commission to bring in an unanimous report on this subject. But then, says Mr. Blockley:

The signing Polish member was recalled, the report repudiated by the Poles, and the Indian legal adviser got his knuckles severely rapped by New Delhi.

Mr. Blockley went on to point out that the story of what happened in North Vietnam after the Geneva Convention is largely unknown because the minutes of the meetings of the International Control Commission and texts of the various majority and minority reports have not been published. He said that these documents would reveal a "constant and flagrant flouting by the Communists" of the terms of the convention and that, despite instructions from their governments to keep contention to a minimum, "The Canadians were compelled to register their dissent from the protection accorded the North Vietnamese by the Poles and Indians on a number of occasions."

Mr. Blockley further expressed the opinion:

The agreement was never really intended to work, and the Commission was always intended to be a facade behind which the Communists * * * were able to mount the assault which finally broke in full fury a few months ago.

Mr. Blockley said that the agreement was hardly signed before the Communist North Vietnamese Government had breached it. He pointed out that although almost a million non-Communis-

nists managed to get away from North Vietnam as the French were surrendering, the agreement provided for exit permits for all others who wished to leave. These were denied tens of thousands of persons of whom the Commission had knowledge. "How many millions more there were of whom the Commission had no knowledge we shall never know," Mr. Blockley said in his letter.

The Commission did know that there was a large-scale revolt in one of the provinces of North Vietnam, said Mr. Blockley, largely over the matter of the refusal of the North Vietnamese authorities to issue the exit permits which had been promised the local population, and to which they were entitled under the agreement. Canadians serving on the Commission's local team saw evidence of the suppression of the revolt with their own eyes, he said, and received full accounts, but the Commission would not, and could not, do anything about it.

Early attempts by some Canadians and a very few Indians to insist that the North Vietnamese carry out the terms of the agreement in respect to certain individuals were tantamount to sentences of death for them, Mr. Blockley reported. The Canadian delegation and even the Indian delegation destroyed thousands of petitions from people in North Vietnam who clearly came within the protecting clauses of the agreement so that there would be no chance of the petitions falling into the hands of the Communist authorities.

During Chou En-lai's state visit to Hanoi, Mr. Blockley was invited, as acting leader of the delegation at the time, to attend the numerous receptions which were accorded Chou. In the course of the evening, he had two long talks with Ho Chi Minh and two with Chou En-lai.

Early next morning, said Mr. Blockley, he was roused by the delegation officer of the day who informed him that a mob had gathered at the delegation office building, and had forced itself into the courtyard of the building, despite the effort of armed Communist guards, and unarmed Canadian soldiers, to keep them out. He was driven hurriedly to the office building. The crowd, which was over a thousand and growing rapidly, let the car through when the orderly officer called out:

C'est Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Canadien.

Entering the building courtyard, said Mr. Blockley, he found 200 or 300 more North Vietnamese milling around, with a score or so of anxious Canadian soldiers keeping them from going up the staircases into the offices themselves. He went up to a half-way landing on one of these staircases, and shouted for silence. Then he singled out an impressive-looking Vietnamese matron to act as spokesman, demanding to know from her what the demonstration was all about. The matron told him that the rumor had quickly spread about Hanoi during the preceding evening and night that the Canadian delegation now enjoyed cordial relations with the Communist authorities, and would now be able to insure the issuance of exit permits to those who had been denied them.

So—she added quite simply to Mr. Blockley—

I knew there would be thousands coming for them today, so I came early for mine, as have these other people.

In the meantime truckloads of armed police and soldiers had been arriving outside, and struggles were developing as they tried to seize people in the crowd. Shouting so that he could be heard above the commotion, Blockley managed to arrest these activities, and then he addressed the crowd from the outside staircase landing.

Que vous êtes fous-fous-fous. How mad you are to come here—

He said—

The Canadian delegation can never, never, never help you; the International Commission can never, never, help you—it does not want to help you. Never come near this building again, nor go near the Commission building. And tell everybody else so. Now, run, run, run, and get away as fast as you can.

As he cried out the last words, Blockley signaled to the Canadian soldiers who swung open the great gates, and the crowd in the courtyard erupted into the crowd outside, and all turned and scattered bowling over many police and soldiers who, miraculously, refrained from opening fire.

Mr. Blockley concluded his account of the incident with these words:

Mercifully, only two or three truckloads of prisoners were borne off in the police vans. All efforts in the Commission subsequently to insure these luckless ones were not punished for attempting to exercise their rights under the Geneva Agreements went without success.

Mr. Blockley said that he frequently returned to his office or his residence to be greeted by North Vietnamese who had somehow managed to smuggle themselves in and who would then plead with him to save them, sometimes throwing their arms around his feet. Among them, he said, there were even some government officials. But since there was absolutely nothing he could do to help them escape, he had no alternative but to compel them to depart by threatening to call the Communist police.

Commenting on this entire experience, Mr. Blockley's letter said:

In view of the Commission's sorry record of failure to extend any sort of protection to persons entitled to such protection under the Geneva Agreements, anyone who suggests it could do any better in assuring a terror-free election throughout North and South Vietnam must be utterly disingenuous, incredibly ignorant, or downright pro-Communist.

Mr. President, at the conclusion of my remarks I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD to complete text of my letter from Mr. Theodore Beaubien Blockley.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

WHAT KIND OF SETTLEMENT

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in preparing for the day when the Communists accept our invitation to meet us at the conference table, the first thing we must

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do, therefore, is to set the record straight in our own minds on the Geneva Convention, so that we will not again be entrapped by a call for a return to the Convention or by any formula similar to the Geneva Convention.

And we must also set the record straight in our own minds on the subject of coalition governments with Communists because I am convinced that such a coalition in Vietnam would be an invitation to total disaster.

The administration has advised the rulers of Hanoi that we place no preconditions on the convening of the diplomatic conference to terminate the hostilities in Vietnam.

But this does not mean that the administration is prepared to accept any conditions posed by the Communists or that it will consent to a peace which would, within a short period of time, result in turning South Vietnam over to Communist control.

President Johnson made this abundantly clear when he warned that there was no power on earth that could force us from Vietnam or that could compel us to abandon the Vietnamese people, who look to us for protection.

There are details of any agreement that cannot be foreseen. On the other hand, I cannot think of any more generous proposal for the settlement of the Vietnamese conflict than the proposal outlined by the administration earlier this year.

This proposal did not call for unconditional surrender on the part of North Vietnam.

It did not even call for compensation to South Vietnam or for territorial concessions on the part of the North.

It asked simply that Hanoi call off its war of aggression against the Government of South Vietnam—and, in return for this, it offered North Vietnam the prospect of participating as a beneficiary in the multibillion-dollar Mekong River plan.

Less than this we could not demand.

More than this we cannot offer, without gravely compromising the freedom of South Vietnam for which so many American boys have now given "the last full measure of devotion."

EXHIBIT 1

SEPTEMBER 29, 1965.

Senator THOMAS J. DODD,
Washington, D.C.,
United States of America.

DEAR SENATOR DODD: Thank you for inviting me to write and tell you of some of my experiences, and views I formed, while I was a member of the Canadian delegation to the International Control Commissions in Indochina. A career diplomat in the Canadian Foreign Service, I was, in 1957-58, Senior Political Adviser to the Canadian Commission on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (to give it its full name in English). I also served as legal adviser to all three Canadian Commissioners (for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) and also was acting leader of the delegation to the Vietnam Commission on a number of occasions. In the course of this service I had several conversations with Ho Chi-minh, Pham Van Dong and General Giap; and with Premier Chou-en-lai and several of the Russian leaders.

The study of the Geneva Agreements (1954) I was called on to make in connection with the performance of my duties led me to the firm conclusion that no legal or moral obligations devolved upon the Government of South Vietnam from the operation of the agreement relating to Vietnam.

The parties to this agreement were France, a defeated colonial power endeavoring to extricate itself from the consequences of a military defeat at the hands of an insurgent body, the other party to the agreement, which was itself opposed by another very large segment of the population.

By no norm of international law with which I am familiar could the onerous undertakings of a colonial power in favor of one segment of the population—of the national community—be regarded as devolving upon another segment of the community which was subsequently successful in wresting its own independence from the colonial power.

As signatories of the agreement, both France and North Vietnam are in breach of the agreement, but it is absurd to talk of the United States or South Vietnam, who opposed the agreement, as having "broken" it.

In any event the agreement was hardly signed before the Communist North Vietnamese Government had breached it. Although almost a million non-Communists managed to get away from North Vietnam as the French were surrendering (an extraordinary mass "voting with the feet" to which I have seen little reference recently), the agreement provided for exit permits for all others who wished to leave. These were denied tens of thousands of persons of whom the Commission had knowledge; how many millions more there were of whom the Commission had no knowledge we shall never know. The Commission does know that there was a large-scale revolt in one of the Provinces of North Vietnam, largely over this matter of the refusal of the North Vietnamese authorities to issue the exit permits which had been promised the local population, and to which they were entitled under the agreement. Canadians serving on the Commission's local team saw evidence of suppression of the revolt with their own eyes, and received full accounts, but the Commission would not, and could not, do anything about it.

Early attempts by some Canadians and a very few Indians to insist that the North Vietnamese carry out the terms of the agreement in respect to certain individuals were tantamount to sentences of death for them. I have referred in an earlier letter to the hours spent by members of the Canadian delegation, including myself, in destroying thousands of petitions from people in North Vietnam who clearly came within the protecting clauses of the agreement, so that there would be no chance of the petitions falling into the hands of the Communist authorities. To give some of the Indians their due, I was told by some of them that they had done likewise with petitions addressed either to their delegation or to the Commission Secretariat.

During Chou En-lai's state visit to Hanoi, I was invited, as acting leader of the delegation at the time, to attend the numerous receptions which were accorded him. At the first of these I was singled out by Ho Chi Minh as the only person at the reception besides the guest of honor, Chou, with whom he conversed. In the course of the evening, I had two long talks with him, and two with Chou En-lai.

Early next morning I was roused by the delegation officer of the day who informed me a mob had gathered at the delegation office building, part of which had forced itself into the courtyard of the building, despite the effort of armed Communist guards, and unarmed Canadian soldiers, to

keep them out. I was driven hurriedly to the office building, the crowd (which I estimated at over a thousand and growing rapidly) letting the car through when the orderly officer called out, "C'est M. l'Ambassadeur canadien."

Going through a postern in the main gates of the carriage entrance to the building courtyard, I found 200 or 300 North Vietnamese milling around in there, with a score or so of anxious Canadian soldiers keeping them from going up the staircases into the offices themselves. I went up to a half-way landing on one of these staircases and shouted for silence, then singled out an impressive looking Vietnamese matron to act as spokesman, demanding to know from her what the demonstration was all about. She told me the rumor had quickly spread about Hanoi during the preceding evening and night that the Canadian delegation now enjoyed cordial relations with the Communist authorities and would now be able to insure the issuance of exit permits to those who had been denied them. "So," she added quite simply, "I knew there would be thousands coming for them today, so I came early for mine, as have these other people."

In the meantime truckloads of armed police and soldiers had been arriving outside, and struggles were developing as they tried to seize people in the crowd. Shouting so that I could be heard above the commotion, I managed to arrest these activities, and then I addressed the crowd from the outside staircase landing. "Que vous êtes fous—fous—fous"—"How mad you are to come here" and going on in French, "The Canadian delegation can never, never, never help you—it does not want to help you. Never come near this building again, nor go near the Commission building. And tell everybody else so. Now, run, run, run, and get away as fast as you can."

As I cried out the last words I signalled to the Canadian soldiers who swung open the great gates, and the crowd in the courtyard erupted into the crowd outside, and all turned and scattered, bowling over many police and soldiers who, miraculously, refrained from opening fire (although we had heard rifle fire in Hanoi previous nights).

The last I saw of the marvelous old Vietnamese dame, she had kilted her ground-length skirts up to her knees, had nimbly dodged two or three soldiers and police, leaped into a pedicab which she must have arranged for beforehand, and careened off down the street, rounding a corner on two wheels while a policeman who had been pursuing her in another pedicab lay sprawled in the street, his pedicab operator, either deliberately or accidentally having upset in attempting to round the same corner.

Mercifully, only two or three truckloads of prisoners were borne off in the police vans. All efforts in the Commission subsequently to ensure these luckless ones were not punished for attempting to exercise their rights under the Geneva Agreements went without success.

In view of the Commission's sorry record of failure to extend any sort of protection to persons entitled to such protection under the Geneva Agreements, anyone who suggests it could do any better in assuring a terror free election throughout North and South Vietnam must be utterly disingenuous, incredibly ignorant or downright pro-Communist!

I will but briefly mention the dreadful experience of finding North Vietnamese in my office and in my residence—the Lord knows how they had managed to get in, evading both the Vietnamese and Canadian guards—who would then plead with me to save them by smuggling them out, breaking down and throwing their arms around my feet, even threatening me, and whom I in

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turn would have to threaten with calling the Communist police before they would leave. Some of these were actually government officials.

When I first arrived in Hanoi I was tendered a reception which was attended by many of the North Vietnamese leaders. Assigned an escorting officer who spoke impeccable French, and very good English, I managed to duck out from under his guard, leaving him pinned down by the British Consul-General and the French Delegate-General. I managed to slip off with three young majors of the North Vietnamese Army, one of whom, I noted—to the evident pleasure of all three—wore the "Hero of Dien Bien Phu" medal, North Vietnam's equivalent of the Medal of Honor. Quickly establishing rapport with the majors—I served for close to 15 years in the Canadian and British Armies and Air Forces—I turned the conversation to political matters. In an effort to convince me of the nobility of the ideals of communism, the "Hero of Dien Bien Phu" referred to the recent conduct of his chief, Col. Ha Van Lo, Head of the North Vietnamese Liaison Mission with the International Commission.

Col. Ha Van Lo, to whom I had been introduced, was standing across the room regarding us with a baleful stare. He looked like a character actor out of Hollywood central casting. A former mandarin, he had a long, thin, cruel, basilisk face—quite the most frightening I have ever seen. Col. Ha Van Lo, said the young major, had had a captive turned over to him quite recently. The captive was his own brother, an officer on the opposite side—in the South Vietnamese Army. Col. Ha Van Lo had then proceeded, personally, to torture his own brother to death—not too quickly—extracting a lot of useful information from him during the process, said my admiring informant. Didn't that prove what a magnificent thing communism must be, to make a man do that to his own brother? Fortunately, at this point my escorting officer came hurrying up to reclaim his charge!

From time to time there has been some measure of public outcry, in the United States, Canada, and in Europe, over the rough treatment sometimes accorded their prisoners by the South Vietnamese soldiery. But one rarely hears of the truly ghastly treatment of South Vietnamese captives by the North Vietnamese. Several of my own non-Communist friends have been most horrifyingly done to death by the Communists. One, Colonel Nam, had his poor shattered corpse dumped in front of his house in Saigon for his wife and children to find. No American photographer found it worth photographing.

As a lesser example of this strange dual morality—the new double standard—we seem to apply as between acts of the Communist world and acts by those on our own side—or perhaps it is only a double standard applied by our western press, radio, and television reporters, commentators, editorialists, all concerned with the International Commission seemed to take it for granted that the Canadians in North Vietnam should be restricted to a 3-block area around their living quarters and office buildings, whereas the Poles, in South Vietnam, would be permitted to go off to summer resorts like Cap St. Jacques, to wander about Saigon at will, and to enjoy the company of local Vietnamese. In my early days in Hanoi the only diversion for Canadians was to go for a postprandial walk around an artificial lake, with a beautiful little pagoda in the middle. It appeared to be the only place in the city where a modicum of privacy was possible, at night, because the Vietcong's operation of Hanoi's power-house was so inefficient, and the park lights merely glimmered at night.

The first night, walking alone, I joined the promenade round and round the "p'tit

lac," and heard voices in the darkness say softly, "G'nicht Mister Canada," "Bon soir, M'sieu." At first I would turn to return the salutation, but would only encounter inscrutable Oriental faces, none seemingly aware of my presence. Shortly, I learned to reply looking straight ahead, without endeavoring to discover who had addressed me. After I had been in Hanoi a while, I learned that it was possible to hold conversations this way—the person talking with me remaining some distance to the side and alternatively moving ahead or falling behind, usually screened by two or three friends—all of us falling silent as newcomers approached.

After I had become friendly with a number of persons this way, mostly university students, 15 or 20 of them would cluster around a park bench which had, in preparation, been inched into the darkest spot in the park, between two glimmering lamp bulbs, at the farthest point from either. From these young men I learned that the whole student body of Hanoi University had been expelled and was being sent to work on the fields, with a complete new undergraduate year being brought in from the country. Hanoi youth were to be left to "cool off" and no high school graduates from the big city schools would be taken into the university that year. The wholesale expulsion was because of a protest by some 20 or 30 students over some issue which I do not remember, if I was ever told. The protesters themselves had disappeared; it was generally surmised they had been executed. The expulsion order applied even to the graduating medical course, and North Vietnam was desperately short of doctors.

I have endeavored in this letter to give some small indication of the inadequacy of the Geneva Agreement relating to Vietnam, and the inability of the International Control Commission (as well as the lack of desire) to protect the people of Vietnam and to give them that freedom of choice which it was pretended was the objective, among others, of the Geneva Agreements.

In my opinion, the agreement was never really intended to work, and the Commission was always intended to be a facade behind which the Communists—and I do not mean merely the Polish or Vietnamese Communists—were able to mount the assault which finally broke in full fury a few months ago.

Espionage, subversion and sabotage was the subject of a unanimous report I finally managed to bring in in the Legal Committee of the Commission; the signing Polish member was recalled, the report repudiated by the Poles, and the Indian legal advisor got his knuckles severely rapped by New Delhi.

I have not gone into the minutiae of constant and flagrant flouting by the Communists of such restrictions as even the Agreement did place upon them; despite instructions to keep contention to a minimum, the Canadians were compelled to register their dissent from the protection accorded the North Vietnamese by the Poles and Indians on a number of occasions. I recommend that you ask the Canadian Government for their record of the Commission's activities, including majority and minority reports to the cochairmen and the minutes of the Commission's meetings. There is no doubt whatever that the Poles have made their record, and the meetings minutes, available to the North Vietnamese, the Chinese and the Russians. I myself have seen North Vietnamese officials with copies of the minutes of previous meetings in their possession.

There is, of course, the Canadian Government's white paper on the Vietnam Commission, issued quite recently, and, in line with this policy, there seems no reason why the Canadian Government should not give qualified Americans, such as the members of your committee, access to selected dispatches from the Canadian delegates and alternates to

the Commission; after all, the U.S. State Department provides the Canadian Department of External Affairs with selected classified material which is very useful for the information of Canadian policymakers, and is released to Canada as an ally of the United States by order of the U.S. Government.

It is very hard for Canadians and Americans to realize that assassination is employed by the Communists as a means of political action, and the spoofing of the fact by novels, movies and television shows makes the idea still less credible to the average Canadian and American. But I have had official dealings with chairmen and secretaries of assassination committees, so designated officially by the North Vietnamese Government. These dealings were part of my duties as a member of the Commission. And the activities of the particular committees concerned extended far out of Vietnam and into Europe. The Communists also employ, of course, subtler assassinations than that of the body. Many people are deterred from coming forward and offering their assistance in the present struggle for these reasons.

But I should count myself a traitor to the spirit of man if I did not offer every assistance which I could give to help you in your work of trying to correct the error and sophistry—making the worse appear the better thing—associated with public consideration of the situation in Vietnam, not only outside the United States, but even within the United States itself. In 1936, although a Canadian, I joined the British Royal Air Force to play a small part in combating nazism—German national socialism; were I 20 today I should be trying to join the U.S. Air Force to make my small contribution in the struggle against Communist socialism, whose fruits I have seen. Regarded as too old today to join an Air Force, I am ready to do what I can.

With my highest regards,

Yours sincerely,

THEODORE BEAUBIEN BLOCKLEY.

EXHIBIT 2

[Vietnam perspective, August 1955]

BACK TO GENEVA 1954?—AN ACT OF POLITICAL

FOLLY

(By Frank N. Trager, professor of international affairs at the Graduate School of Public Administration, New York University)

Various voices, including the distinguished U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, have urged that in seeking an effective and reasonable settlement of the war in Vietnam "much (may) . . . be said for a return to the Geneva Accords in 1954, not just in their 'essentials' but in all their specifications." (Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT, "Address on Vietnam," the New York Times, June 16, 1965.)

Close study of these agreements leads to an opposite conclusion neither the "essentials" nor the "specifications" of Geneva 1954 should be sought again. They were written in haste and ended in compromise with, and concessions to, the Communist powers. They add up to political folly. These agreements aided Communist North Vietnam to initiate further struggle against South Vietnam and prevented any objective peacekeeping machinery from performing its assigned function. They also fed the Pathet Lao in Laos and helped to bring the country almost to ruin. (The Western solution as proposed in the Geneva 1962 Agreements for Laos: majority voting within the Control Commission, more careful definition of the controls, freedom of movement for the Commission with provisions for its movement, are better than those of 1954, but still not good enough. They have been effectively negated by the Pathet Lao military hold on the territory now legally assigned to them—territory contiguous to China and to North Vietnam

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which they have illegally held since and because of ambiguities in Geneva 1954.)

The 1954 agreements contain a declaration of 13 articles; and 3 agreements governing the "cessation of hostilities" in Cambodia (33 articles), Laos (41 articles) and Vietnam (47 articles). It is quite probable that those who recommend these "essential" and "specific" agreements have not fully studied them—or even, in many cases, read them.

Nine states took part in the Geneva 1954 Conference: Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the Communist North), Laos, France, the People's Republic of China, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the State of Vietnam (soon to become the Republic) and the United States. The latter two refused to sign the Declaration. They issued separate "declarations." The United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. became the cochairmen to oversee the execution of the agreements. Though the Conference began (on the Korean questions) on April 26, it reached the Indochinese questions on May 8, ending on July 21.

The U.S. declaration held that it would abide by the Geneva Declaration provided that the signatories refrained in the future from the threat or use of force; it also indicated that "any renewal of the aggression in violation of the * * * Agreements" would be viewed "with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security"; and that it would "not join in an arrangement which would hinder" the peoples of Vietnam in determining their own future.

In this connection it should be emphasized that though neither the United States nor the Republic of Vietnam were signatories to the Geneva Agreements of 1954, this fact of itself did not wholly relieve the two governments from observing the provisions of these Agreements provided all other parties to them abided by them. There is precedent in international law for observing treaties and agreements which cover a zone or subject of interests even if a government is not signatory to the treaty. However, any breach of the articles of the agreement by any of the contracting parties automatically suspends or destroys the basis for compliance by other contracting or related parties. It certainly relieves nonsignatories from any actual or implied obligation to observe the provisions of the treaty or agreement.

It is clear that the U.S. representatives at Geneva had little confidence in its conclusions; that they expected trouble and therefore provided legitimate tests by which the United States could legally and honorably determine its course of action. Any objective examination of the post-Geneva conduct of North Vietnam with respect to the key provisions of the Agreements; military matters, treatment of civilian populations in the zone of the south from which its cadres were to depart and in its own territory, and aiding and abetting internal subversion, yields data sufficient to declare that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam violated the Agreements almost as soon as they were signed. Those who now say that the United States was (and is) guilty of violation when in the critical years, 1954-56, it applied the tests written into the Agreements to determine the bona fides of the contracting parties, are either misinformed or willing dupes of a Communist propaganda line.

The various non-Communist state delegations at Geneva were in part the victims of French political pressure, created by Premier Mendes-France who came to power in mid-June on a policy which promised a solution to the Geneva conference and the end of the Franco-Vietnamese war by July 21 or his resignation. Premier Mendes-France was openly in opposition to the U.S.-supported European Defense Community concept—as was the U.S.S.R. He thereby gained (in secret sessions) some cooperation from

Molotov, the Russian representative, in fulfilling his timetable but at the expense of compromises and concessions which the Western powers and the State of Vietnam had not wanted to make. Since the Geneva Conference was called to end the hostilities in French Indo-China, and since France was to be the cosigner of the cessation of hostilities agreements with the Communist North Vietnam, as well as with the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia, the Western powers reluctantly and unwisely acquiesced in France's position.

The assorted 134 articles of the Geneva Agreements¹ treat 5 major topics: the cease-fire; regroupment of forces and treatment of populations; post-cessation military assistance; elections; and international supervisory arrangements to guarantee the first 4.

1. Cease-fire: The Western powers wanted to insure agreement on cease-fire before political questions were discussed. The Communists insisted on their being couped and won out since the military situation had been steadily going against the French, climaxed by the fall of Dienbienphu on the very day, May 8, when the discussions on Indo-China began. The Communist delegations (as in 1965) made a determined bid to include the Communist Khmer (Cambodian) and Pathet Lao forces as regular members of the Geneva Conference on the grounds that these were "national liberation forces." Here, at least the opposition of the royal Lao and Cambodian governments prevailed over the Vietminh (Communists) delegation from Hanoi. But the latter won a major concession, as we shall see, when this type of question came up under regroupment. Though the cease-fire agreements prohibited the "resumption of hostilities" (Cmd. 9239, Vietnam, article 10, 19 and 24) and though these articles refer to "armed forces" and "regular troops," nothing that the Americans and the British could do succeeded in persuading the French negotiators to insist that "irregular" i.e. guerrilla forces, be included in this prohibition.

Withdrawals of the regular armed forces, including equipment and supplies (Cmd. 9239, Vietnam, article 15), were to be completed within 300 days. They were to take place without hindrance, destruction or sabotage of any public property and without injury to the civil population. As a matter of record the withdrawal of the Vietminh forces from the zone of the south was accompanied by considerable looting and destruction of public buildings and railroads, systematic destruction or theft of the files, documents and especially land registries in the upper provinces close to the 17th parallel, and kidnapping or murder of local officials. But by contrast to the activity of the "irregulars" who were left behind these were transient woes visited upon the Government and people of South Vietnam.

Immediately after the Geneva Agreements were signed, the leader of North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, publicly vowed to bring about the reunification of his state with that of the Republic of Vietnam. There is nothing reprehensible in such a view. Many Vietnamese, like many Germans and Koreans are pledged to the eventual reunification of their countries. What is at issue is the methods employed to achieve the goal. In 1955, the Vietminh "irregular" cadres in the South organized what came to be called the "Army of Liberation" and began its military, terror, and kidnapping operations against the Republic of Vietnam.

In mid-1956 I toured the delta of South Vietnam to visit installations of the Philip-

pine-manned Operation Brotherhood, a medical and social work nongovernmental aid effort and the Cai San resettlement villages of northerners who voted with their feet against the Communist north. In both areas we had to have military protection because our jeeps and canal boats were subject to Vietminh fire. The country was at war with an enemy led, trained, inspired, and encouraged by Communists whose loyalty was to Hanoi, and who were attempting to overthrow a legitimate government which had become a republic the previous year.

The irregulars using arms and ammunition cached prior to the withdrawal of the regular armed forces, were the cadres of the Vietminh; i.e. the Communist north, left behind in the south to carry out guerrilla warfare as planned. They operated under various names such as the Patriotic Front or United Front or Fatherland Front. Estimates vary but somewhere between 5,000 to 10,000 irregulars were thus available in the south to conduct warfare. And though the armed forces of the contracting parties were not to commit acts and operations, nothing was said in the agreements about infiltration, terrorism, assassination, and covert military operations—classic aspects of Communist tactics—which could be and were conducted by these irregulars.

2. Regroupment and treatment of population: The aim of the Communists was to insist on large regroupment and assembly areas which could then be controlled by their forces. The Western Powers apparently never agreed on what they wanted. The Cambodians won out on having no regroupment area in their state—only withdrawals. But the Communists, also won out elsewhere by demanding the north and northeastern provinces of Laos and then settling for those provinces contiguous to Communist China and North Vietnam—a position further reinforced by the Geneva 1962 agreements.

Each party (Cmd. 9239, art. 14c) undertook to refrain from "reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee democratic liberties." The Communists used this to attack the Diem government when it sought to repress the (northern) army of liberation which began to operate in 1955. But, it used terror, assassination, and suppression to wipe out dissident, anti-Communist leadership in the north. And, as we shall see, inspections could not or were not undertaken.

According to article 14d, during the 300 days assigned to military regroupment and exchanges, civilians were to enjoy the option of choosing to remain or to depart from residence. This period was extended by agreement to a new cut-off date, July 25, 1955. By then approximately 861,000 persons left the North for the South, as against less than 5,000 choosing the North. This latter figure must be coupled with approximately 100,000 Vietminh troops of various kinds inclusive of their dependents who went north as part of the military exchange. However, the obvious disparity in numbers led the North to impose restrictions and brutal punishments on those who sought to go South. Summary arrests, denial of permits, intimidation by "show trials" of those who served as leaders of the exodus and executions, served to inhibit the exercise of the option. Residual petitions affecting 95,000 persons in the North were presented to the International Control Commission. Nothing ever came of these. They and an unknown number were never allowed to leave the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.²

² The refugee problem was one of the most far-reaching issues at the time. See Richard W. Lindholm, ed. "Vietnam, The First Five Years" (Michigan State University Press, 1959), pp. 48-103. There is much supporting evidence for the approximated 861,000 fig-

¹ The Geneva Agreements are to be found in "Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference; and Further Documents" (London: HMSO, 1954), (Cmd. 9186 and 9239).

3. Military Assistance: Articles 16-19 (Vietnam) banned "troop reinforcements," "additional military personnel," new war material, new bases and foreign controlled bases. These terms were either not defined or ill-defined. Rotation, replacement of war material, etc. were permitted under inspection. But the inspection teams were not allowed to function particularly in the classified military security areas of North Vietnam close to the Chinese border. And though the American military advisers replaced the French after 1955-56, the Vietminh argued their illegality and protested while its own forces were augmented by Sino-Soviet materials and advisers and while it was augmenting the Vietcong forces within South Vietnam. Nothing was said in these agreements about the size of national armies, local production of arms and other aspects of war-potential which might make it possible for one state to threaten the security of another.

4. Elections. Through the Western Powers originally suggested that these be postponed until security was established, the Russians proposed elections in 1 year and because of Mendes-France secured an agreement that election consultations be started in 1 year (July 1955) and held not later than July 1956. The French thereby agreed to a provision which they would have no future right or power to enforce. The state of Vietnam had indicated that it would accept elections only if the country were not partitioned and if the United Nations would supervise such elections "so as to insure their freedom and genuineness." Obviously such conditions never were met. And by 1956, the Vietminh organs of repression within the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had made it well-nigh impossible to hold free elections within that Communist country.

5. The International Control and Supervision Commission: Article 34 (Vietnam) created the ICC—as it came to be called—composed, as a compromise, of representatives of three states: India, chairman, Canada, and Poland. The ICC was charged with control and supervision of all the foregoing operations. It was to set up fixed and mobile inspection teams. If the inspection teams could not settle an incident they could report to the Commission. The latter had the power to decide some issues by majority vote (article 41) but "questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities * * * must be unanimous" (article 42). These, of course, were the major issues and they required unanimity. Further, any member of the ICC could insist that a question at issue came under article 42, not 41.

The effect was stultification. This was the first application of Moscow's "troika" principle, later advanced for the United Nations itself. Poland could always veto an issue if it was not consonant with Communist policy—and did so. India, especially before its ox was gored by the Chinese Communists, refused to cast a majority vote even on the lesser questions because it would "increase tensions" or some such rot. As a result, the ICC, unable to provide for its own mobility, frequently deprived of necessary help from both Vietnam states, powerless to come to a decision on important matters, served little if any useful purpose. Even Canada, in the first critical months of the ICC chose to interpret its role as an "impartial" one and sought to play out the game as if its impartiality would assist in an ultimate decision-making potential within the ICC. Canada—and all other interested parties learned better later. On those rare occasions when the ICC arrived at recommendations, it lacked sanctions to enforce them. If one of the

ure used above. It climbed in subsequent years by illegal immigration—perhaps another 100,000.

states refused to accept a recommendation, the best the ICC would do was to refer the matter to the Geneva Conference Cochairmen, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. (article 43). Obviously the Soviets had yet another forum for its in-built veto.

The Geneva Agreements were thus inept, hopelessly ensnared in a mess of irresolution, ill-defined, with no policeman capable of handling any but the most unimportant complaints and minor violations. To go back to their "essentials" or their "specifications" is to go back to a political sieve helpful only in advancing the Communist cause of warfare at the lower end of the spectrum: infiltration, subversion, guerrilla activity—the so-called wars of national liberation.

As another Johnson (Dr. Samuel), said, "Let there be an end on it, sir."

EXHIBIT 3

[From Time, Oct 22, 1965]

SOUTH VIETNAM—A NEW KIND OF WAR

It was only 3 months ago that the lethal little men in black pajamas roamed the length and breadth of South Vietnam marauding, maiming and killing with impunity. No highway was safe by night, and few by day; the trains had long since stopped running. From their tunneled redoubts, the Communist Vietcong held 65 percent of South Vietnam's land and 55 percent of its people in thrall. Saigon's armies were bone weary and bleeding from defections. As the momentum of their monsoon offensive gathered, the Communists seemed about to cut the nation in half with a vicious chop across the central highlands. The enemy was ready to move in for the kill, and South Vietnam was near collapse.

Today South Vietnam throbs with a pride and power, above all an esprit, scarcely credible against the summer's somber vista. Government desertion rates have plummeted and recruitment is up, and it is now the Communists who are troubled with rising defections. Some roads are being reopened for the first time in years, and the much-vaunted Vietcong plan to move into their mass attack third phase is now no more than a bedraggled dream.

The remarkable turnaround in the war is the result of one of the swiftest, biggest military buildups in the history of warfare. Everywhere today South Vietnam bustles with the U.S. presence. Bulldozers by the hundreds carve sandy shore into vast plateaus for tent cities and airstrips. Howitzers and trucks grind through the once-empty green highlands. Wave upon wave of combat-boated Americans—lean, laconic and looking for a fight—pour ashore from armadas of troopships. Day and night, screaming jets and prowling helicopters seek out the enemy from their swampy strongholds in southernmost Camau all the way north to the mountain gates of China. The Vietcong's once-cocky hunters have become the cowering hunted as the cutting edge of U.S. firepower slashes into the thickets of Communist strength. If the United States has not yet guaranteed certain victory in South Vietnam, it has nonetheless undeniably averted certain defeat. As one top-ranking U.S. officer put it: "We've stemmed the tide."

"WE WILL STAND"

It was late July when the President of the United States summoned his aids to a 3-day secret session to deliberate Vietnam. Just back from Saigon was Defense Secretary Robert McNamara with the grim prognosis of peril. When Johnson announced his decision, it was the most significant for American foreign policy since the Korean War: "We will stand in Vietnam." To stand meant in fact that the United States would go to Vietnam in overwhelming force and stay until the job was done. Why? "If we are driven from the field in Vietnam," the President told the Nation and the world,

"then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise or in American protection."

By then, 75,000 American servicemen already were present in South Vietnam or pledged to go. The President promised 50,000 more by the end of this year, and the promise was soon outstripped by the deed. The 50,000 were on the scene by mid-September—and they just kept coming. Today the total is 145,000, and it will pass 200,000 by New Year's Day. Target by next summer: 280,000.

Appropriately, the world's most mobile division, the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile)—or "the First Team," as its men proudly style themselves—was among the first off the mark. Within 2 weeks after Johnson's announcement, the first of four supply ships carrying the bulk of the division's 428 helicopters was on its way, and on their heels came the first of the division's 16,000 men, commanded by Maj. Gen. Harry William Osborn Kinnard. At the same time, an advance party of 1,000 men, 254 tons of equipment and 9 "huey" helicopters was quietly whisked to Vietnam from the division's Fort Benning base in a secret, 7-day airlift.

By late August the advance party was on the job: preparing near An Khe deep in the Vietcong-infested Central Highlands a giant helipad for the first team's covey of copters. The division's assistant commander, Brig. Gen. John M. Wright, took machete in hand to show his men how to do it, chopping away the scrub without disturbing the grass, so as to avoid dust storms as the choppers rotated in and out. Today the first team's garrison at An Khe is the largest concentration of fighting men and machinery in southeast Asia since the French left Indochina in 1954—and predictably its well-turfed 12,000 square feet helipad is known far and wide as "the golf course."

BUILDING TO STAY

If "the golf course" is a triumph of sweat and ingenuity, Cam Ranh Bay, a building 190 miles north of Saigon, is the manifesto of American engineering. Fifteen miles long, 5 miles wide, deep enough for any ocean vessel, rimmed by smooth, sun-blached beaches, Cam Ranh Bay was probably the world's most underdeveloped great natural harbor. Until, that is, 4 months ago—when the 4,000 men of the 35th Engineer Group went to work.

With bulldozers and dynamite, they have moved mountains of sand, built some 40 miles of road, helped construct a 10,000-foot runway from which the first jets will blast off against the enemy next month. Ammo depots, a 10-tank fuel dump with a capacity of 230,000 gallons, and a T-pler are all under construction; next month a floating 350-foot De Long pier will be towed in from Charleston, S.C.

When finished early next year at a cost that may run as high as \$100 million, Cam Ranh will be a port the size of Charleston, easing the pressure on Saigon's chockablock facilities. It will need all the dock space the engineers can clear: one measure of the U.S. commitment in Vietnam is that last January only 65,000 tons of military equipment were fed into the nation by sea; during November more than 750,000 tons will arrive—a tenfold increase. Eventually, Cam Ranh's facilities will be able to store 45 days' supply for all the U.S. forces in central Vietnam. As much as any single installation in Vietnam, Cam Ranh is concrete and steel testimony that the United States is in southeast Asia to stay.

PX'S AND PUP TENTS

Around South Vietnam's four present jet fields—Da Nang, Chu Lai, Bien Hoa, and Saigon—are clustered most of the rest of the U.S. presence in Vietnam. On the "hot pads" at the runway ends of each stand the silver planes, bombs aboard, on phased alert;

the first wave is on 5-minute call, the next on 15-minute call, then a group on 30-minute call, finally a wave on an hour's notice. On the average, within 17 minutes of a platoon leader's radioed call for help, the jets can be over the target with almost any combination of weapons he might need: .50-caliber machinegun bullets, cannon shells, Bulldog Pup missiles, Zuni rockets, napalm, 260-pound to 3,000-pound bombs. At the newest of the fields, Chu Lai, leveled and surfaced with aluminum matting by the Seabees in less than 30 days last spring, the runway is still so short that the jets take off in a double-throated roar of engines and jet-assisted takeoff bottles, sometimes returning to land carrier-style with an arresting cable at runway's end.

The marines at Chu Lai are accustomed to the roar over their tents on the steaming dunes. Less easy to take has been the choking dust, now damped down by the first northern monsoons, and the fact that the nearest liberty is the Marine headquarters town of Da Nang. "That's like being allowed to leave the State prison to go to the county jail," snorts one leatherneck. In Da Nang and Phu Bai, the rains have turned the infernal red dust into infernal red mud, in which a truck can sink to its door handles. On the perimeters, the marines and infantrymen live like soldiers on perimeters everywhere—primitively, with pup tents, ponchos, and C-rations. The airmen at Da Nang boast big, airy tents with screened windows and solid floors, a new PX and messhall. Most of the 173d Airborne and Big Red One troops at Bien Hoa now have hot meals and floors under their tents.

FROM DEFENSE TO OFFENSE

The U.S. military has been in Vietnam in an advisory role to Government forces ever since the French were swept out in 1954—a role that grew with the swelling magnitude of the Vietcong threat until eventually it required 24,000 men. But it was not until last March, when the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade of 3,500 men swarmed ashore at Danang, that the first U.S. combat troops entered the fray. Like the 7,500 men of the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 101st Airborne's Danang 1st Brigade that soon followed, the marines' first assignment was defensive: creating a protective enclosure around bustling Danang airbase and harbor. The 173d was thrown around Bien Hoa Airbase, together with the 2d Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division—the Big Red One—which arrived in July. The Screaming Eagles of the 101st helped reopen Route 19 from the coast to An Khe, stood watch while the 1st Air Cavalry's advance party hacked out their "golf course."

Standing watch was all that many critics thought U.S. combat troops would—or could—do in Vietnam. Even as the number of GIs swelled, the myth remained that Americans were somehow not up to the wiles of the Vietcong or the woes of the Asian jungle.

U.S. troops were soon besting the Vietcong in fire fights from Chu Lai to An Khe. The 34,000 marines in Vietnam boast a 5 to 1 kill ratio over the enemy, have spread their original beachhead until now they control 400 square miles of territory. When a bad bit of intelligence unloaded the 101st Screaming Eagles from their helicopters right into a battalion of Vietcong near An Khe, the Eagles fought hand-to-mortar until the field was theirs. Soon the increasing aggressiveness of American ground troops everywhere was adding yet another dimension of fear and uncertainty for the Vietcong, already long harassed by U.S. air and sea power.

PLANES AND SHIPS

The United States first bombed the north in August 1964 in tit-for-tat retaliation for a torpedo-boat attack on two 7th Fleet destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf. Regular

bombings began last February; since then United States and South Vietnamese planes have flown more than 50,000 sorties against the enemy. The 800 planes in use range from the old prop-driven Skyraider, whose fond jockeys insist that it can fly home with nearly as much enemy lead in it as the 4 tons of bombs it can carry out, to the droop-nosed, brutal-looking ("It's so damn ugly it's beautiful") F-4B Navy Phantom, at 1,700 miles per hour the fastest machine in the Vietnamese skies. Then there is the Navy's Intruder, a computer-fed, electronics-crammed attack ship that virtually flies itself once aloft.

Along with the fighter-bombers goes a covey of other craft; jammers to knock out the enemy's radar, flying command and communications posts, planes whose radar sweeps the sky for signs of attacking Communist aircraft, RF-101 photoreconnaissance planes dive into the smoke to film the raid's damage for analysis back home, using strobelike parachute flares at night. Backing the raids also are the planes and helicopters of the Air Rescue Service, ready to pluck a downed airman out of the enemy heartland.

Some 400 of the daily strike planes are based aboard the carriers of Task Force 77 of the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet. The two flat-tops on "Yankee Station" shoot their planes off over North Vietnam, while the "Dixie Station" carrier normally hits only Vietcong in the south. The 30 ships, 400 warplanes and 27,000 men of "77" are not included in the 145,000-man total of forces now in Vietnam. But they are very much a part of the war, and not merely of the air war. When U.S. Marines systematically took apart a Vietcong regiment on the Van Thuong Peninsula south of Chu Lai last August, two destroyers and a cruiser of Task Force 77 bombarded Vietcong bunkers, blasted to pieces a Red company that tried to escape over the beach. Fact is, 7th Fleet Commander Adm. Paul P. Blackburn's floating artillery can make life miserable—and hazardous—for the Vietcong up to 15 miles from the coast, and his screen of smaller craft on patrol duty in "Operation Market Time" has sharply limited Vietcong gunrunning by boat along the shore.

THE GADGETRY

Also at work for the United States in Vietnam is an array of ingenious gadgetry that smacks of baling wire—and of Buck Rogers. Puff the Magic Dragon is an old C-47 transport rigged with three 7.62 Gatling-type guns—each a fascine of six machinegun barrels. In the time it takes to say "puff," the dragon can spit 300 bullets at Vietcong on the ground. "It's a solid bar of fire," explains a U.S. officer, "and the noise is a terrible roar." The Lightning Bug is a UH-1B helicopter fitted with seven brilliant landing lights. It goes sampan hunting along Vietcong rivers or canals. Antipeeper peepers include Topsy 33, a ground-surveillance radar first used by the marines along their Danang perimeter. By the end of this year, a steel-mesh net platform that can be laid by helicopters across jungle treetops will be in use by choppers as a do-it-yourself landing pad; the disordered troops shinny down through the branches on a metal and nylon ladder.

The single most expensive piece of equipment in use in Vietnam is an Air Force C-130 loaded with \$2,500,000 worth of communications equipment. Known as the ABCCC (Airborne Battle Control and Command Center), the plane is in fact a flying command post, equipped with 8 television screens for projecting slides and maps from its data storage drums, which contain 5,000 pieces of military intelligence—the last word for armchair-borne commanders.

STILL SAIGON'S WAR

When massive U.S. intervention in Vietnam was bruited, there were those who argued against it on the grounds that weary South Vietnamese troops would simply quit

in relief, let the Americans do their fighting for them. The U.S. buildup has indeed been decisive in halting the Vietcong drive toward victory—but in large part because it has given the South Vietnamese, whose 600,000-man army continues to bear the brunt of battle, the help they need to go on fighting.

It remains very much their war. In the 4 months after U.S. combat units largely went into action, some 3,000 Government soldiers were killed in action compared to 275 Americans. Over the same period, U.S. troops ran 384 company-size operations resulting in contact with the Vietcong; South Vietnamese soldiers conducted 1,805. As the U.S. buildup has mounted, the monthly Government losses have been paired: from 1,300 in July, to 800 in August, to 567 in September.

While Saigon's soldiers got some breathing room, the once-cocksure Vietcong found themselves choking in a new kind of war. Their massive monsoon assaults never materialized—because quick-scrumbling allied planes all too often flew off through the rainstorms to blast a company apart before it could attack. Whereas in the first flush of their summer successes the Reds could count on an eye for an eye, by August the kill ratio had dropped to 1 to 3 against them—and they are likely to lose 27,000 men in action this year against an estimated 12,000 for the allies (including 1,000 Americans).

Not only was the mass assault third phase in Mao Tse-tung's guerrilla rulebook arrested, but the Vietcong found themselves being rooted out of havens they had long considered invulnerable. Twice in the last month—first near Ben Cat in the "Iron Triangle" north of Saigon, then last week in Operation Concord in Binh Dinh Province—massive allied sweeps penetrated preserves lethally off limits to anyone but Communists for 15 years.

THE SLEEPLESS ENEMY

Sweep forces usually encountered few Vietcong but often found supplies, such as enough rice in the Triangle to feed a Vietcong regiment for 4 months. They also uncovered dirt-fresh evidences of the Communists' long-famed trenching arts; tunnels up to 40 feet deep and several hundred yards long, with angled corridors and galleries to reduce blast effects, air vents, and emergency exits.

Even the deepest tunnels are not safe from the 1,000-pound bombs of the Guam-based B-52's, falling in sticks neatly bracketed to decapitate a small mountain. When the big bombers, converted from carrying nuclear weapons, first began making the 5,200-mile round trip from Guam to Vietnam, critics snorted that it was overkill run riot, using elephants to swat mosquitoes. But the point was to hit the Vietcong without warning (the B-52's fly so high that they are seldom seen or heard by their targets) in the heart of their 11 major strongholds, keep them edgy and off balance. The SAC planes have hit such strongholds as the Iron Triangle hard and often, and it is now so pitted with B-52 bomb craters and caved-in Vietcong tunnels that wags call it the "Gruyère Triangle." Airpower may well prove to be the guerrillas' worst enemy. The Reds are less and less welcome in villages, since the villagers are learning that their presence may well bring the planes. Forced to move oftener, the guerrillas are getting less and less sleep. Captures and desertions are rising. Recently captured in the Gruyère Triangle: a Vietcong battalion commander's order that his troops eschew, among other things, "collective singing of folk songs" and handclapping for fear of detection.

It once was a rare day when more than a handful of Vietcong weapons was left on a battlefield, but of late the Vietcong have become quite untidy: Operation Starlight

netted 614 dead Vietcong and 109 weapons. More recently, Vietnamese troops killed 34 of the enemy—and captured 34 weapons—on an operation. Government figures showing a 300-percent increase in the number of Vietcong defecting under the "open arms" amnesty program may be exaggerated, but the curve is definitely up.

Though harassed, the Vietcong are far from beaten. Despite their heavy losses and their loss of tactical momentum, they still hold vast chunks of South Vietnamese real estate. Thanks to an infiltration rate still running at an all-time high of 1,000 men a month from the north, the Communists have actually managed to increase their strength, now have in South Vietnam an estimated 65,000 main force and regional troops, 80,000 to 100,00 guerrillas, and perhaps 40,000 fellow travelers in logistical and political cadres.

KEY TO POWER

Yet the enemy now faces an irrevocable U.S. commitment, and as a result, Saigon of late has had a spring in the step and a sparkle in the eye missing for years. Its visible embodiment is jaunty, popular Premier Nguyen Cao Ky, 35, who has moved with verve from scarf-clad air force commander to chairman of the board in the military collegium now ruling the nation. Ky is the closest thing to a national hero that South Vietnam has, and wherever he goes in Saigon, admiring teenagers gather round.

Ky's promises of social reform and a vigorous attack on corruption, coupled with the recent allied successes against the Vietcong, have so far kept the Nation's fractious Buddhists and Catholics quiescent: they simply cannot find credible grievances that will bring crowds into the street. Even though the Ky government has made no dent in the nation's two big problems—its 680,000 refugees and its soaring inflation—Saigon's political situation, say old hands, is the most stable that it has been since 1960. From time to time, there are complaints that it is too stable, precisely because the military junta is running it, and that civilians ought to be in charge. Ky's Chief of State, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, answers that bluntly: "I don't believe that any civilian government would have enough power to fight the Communists."

Before Ky and the U.S. buildup, Vietnamese desertions were running at a disastrous 500 a month and recruiting was at an alltime low. The desertion rate has now fallen to minimal levels, and Saigon's reserves are at last swelling at the targeted rate of 10,000 new men a month.

WORKING TOGETHER

Perhaps the best measure that the nation increasingly shares Ky's credo is the fact that negotiation with the Vietcong is seldom even discussed. "The only way we can lose this war now," says Thieu, "is in a political or moral way—not in a tactical way. So why should any of us talk of negotiation? If we talk about negotiation now, we give the enemy hope and confidence." Still no one in Saigon—or Washington—has any illusions about the job remaining to be done. Gen. Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, used to think in terms of 10 years to finish off the Vietcong, now says cautiously, "Maybe I'm a 9½-year man." Even the most optimistic U.S. officials think 5 years the outside minimum.

With the arrival of the 5,000 marines of South Korea's 15,000-man Blue Dragon brigade at Cam Ranh Bay last week, the allies' combined strength rose to nearly 750,000. Orders for the Vietnamese forces issue from the quiet, air-conditioned offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 acres of yellow stucco French colonial buildings in Saigon that once housed the French high command. Chief of

State Thieu heads it. Downtown, in his offices on Pasteur Street, the American commander in Vietnam, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, presides over the complex of U.S. commands ranging from Lt. Gen. Joseph Moore's 2d Air Division to Maj. Gen. Lewis Walt's 3d Marine Amphibious Force. The Army's biggest clout is contained in the recently created Field Force Vietnam under Maj. Gen. Stanley ("Swede") Larsen. Headquartered in Nha Trang in the largest and hardest pressed of Vietnam's four corps areas, Force V includes the 1st Team at An Khe, the 101st Airborne's 1st Brigade, and the arriving South Koreans, who will be under American command. The Royal Australian Regiment and the Royal New Zealand artillery batteries are largely under their own command. Working from the long-established pattern of the advisers' program, U.S. officers confer with their Vietnamese counterparts virtually on a daily basis up and down the line.

THE HEROES

There are many Vietnamese heroes of the long war. One of the most benedicted is Lt. Col. Nguyen Thanh Yen, 42, of the Vietnamese marines, who has spent 15 years fighting the Communists. A bitter, brown, gnarled man called the "Little Tiger," Yen last week, as he always does, was walking every step of the way with his 1,400-man Vietnamese task force in Operation Concord. Beside him was his adviser, U.S. Marine Maj. William Leftwich, 34, whom one of his superiors has called the best American adviser in the country. They set out early in the dazzling morning sun, trudging past the napalmed black bodies of Vietcong killed in a battle the week before.

By midday the heat had Yen's men gasping. Some were vomiting. Then the Vietcong sprang their ambush. Two marines were killed instantly, and five were wounded. "Get up, you batsards," snarled Yen. "It's only a few snipers—get up and move after them." The marines went, and Bill Leftwich, one of the 6,500 U.S. advisers who sometimes feel that they are the "forgotten men" in the new war, went too. The brittle Yen had run through five U.S. advisers until Leftwich came along. By quiet persuasion, Leftwich got Yen to add an engineering platoon, a 75-mm. howitzer platoon, a support and a signal detachment to what had been a medieval band. Since then, Colonel Yen and his men have been killing Vietcong at a 9-to-1 ratio.

THE ELUSIVE TARGET

The basic U.S. strategy in Vietnam today, now that its defensive enclaves are secured, is to go over to the offensive, hitting out from the bases in fairly large-scale thrusts at main Vietcong striking forces—to break them up, keep them off balance, erode their influence. For the present, the United States is less interested in expanding its geography than in wearing down the enemy. The priority targets, as the United States sees them now: first, the U.S. Marines' Hue-Danang-Chu Lai area, then as much of Binh Dinh province as can be cleared, finally the Hop Tac region around Saigon.

The very success of U.S. firepower so far is likely to make big kills harder and harder to come by, as Operation Concord in Binh Dinh province last week proved. An estimated 45,000 Vietcong have been in Binh Dinh, and in the largest operation of the war, 14,000 allied troops went in at 3 points to try to kill a sizable batch of them. Two hundred helicopters made 358 sorties to drop 5,500 men into Suoi Ca Valley, where a Vietcong regiment was reported. Another 2,500 of the first team were out to clear "Happy Valley" next door to the west, while Vietnamese marines and army battalions closed in from the coast. But as all too often in the frustrating war, there was virtually nobody home. Even where the enemy is de-

cisively smashed, unless allied troops stay, the Vietcong soon slip back.

AFTER THE SHOOTING

The real reason that the battle for Vietnam is only beginning is that battles themselves are only the beginning. When the shooting stops, some sort of Vietnamese authority, ideally local police, must be ready to move in at once to keep the hamlet secure from the Vietcong. After security, the needs multiply: reconstruction of the local economy, land reform, better food and medical care, schools, the beginnings of justice. "In order to win," in the longrun, says Ky, "there must be a full social revolution in Vietnam—our revolution, no one else can do it for us." U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge agrees, and a large part of his working day and that of the U.S. mission is spent in helping the Vietnamese lay the foundations for their own revolution. "These people," says Lodge, "have always had a strong sense of peoplehood. What we are now trying to give them is a strong sense of nationhood."

U.S. officials estimate that if pacification is really going to work, ultimately each district (comparable to an American county) will need at least 200 administrators, public health officers, teachers, and engineers. South Vietnam has 220 districts, so 45,000 trained men will be needed. Nowhere near that many are in sight.

SHOWING THE WAY

It is the U.S. Marines who are providing the best pilot model for a pacification program. No fewer than 10,000 marines stood guard recently while the peasant near Danang brought in their rice crop free of the Vietcong—who are accustomed to seizing a large part of it for their own supplies. Navy doctors and corpsmen are treating more than 500 civilians a day in forward military marine areas. To the peasants lined up for sick call, the marines hand out food, clothes, toys, and soap (donated in 100-ton lots of slightly used bathtub bars by the Sheraton and Hilton hotel chains), on occasion have even fed the peasants' livestock and rebuilt their pens. They have built schools and paved over the long unused Saigon-Hue railroad to make the only road in the Danang area that is passable during the monsoons. Result: for the first time in 11 years, peasants are getting their produce to the Danang market.

Recently in Phu Bai a navy doctor paused in the midst of treating a long line of village children to wipe his brow and expostulated: "Dammit, if we could just get these people to wash their kids off with soap and water, half of the cases we're treating here today wouldn't be sick." A marine corporal nearby listened and nodded. Next day five marines, four washtubs and a bag of towels pulled into Phu Bai in a jeep, and an assembly line was soon set up. One by one the village's toddlers were dunked, scrubbed, and rinsed (twice), and finally towed off. By the time the job was done, the villagers had clearly concluded that it was the finest, funniest show ever staged in Phu Bai—and public health had taken one more small step forward in Vietnam.

Meanwhile the marines, day in and day out, in methodical, grinding patrols against the Vietcong, are killing an average 40 Vietcong a week—at roughly the cost of one marine dead and five wounded a day. Typical was a night's work last week. After dusk a marine platoon surrounded a hamlet in which Vietcong had been reported hiding out, split into five squads and sat down to wait. No one spoke, no cigarettes were allowed, nor was mosquito repellent, despite the stinging swarms—for a trained soldier can smell the chemical 50 yards away. Around 3 a.m. a drenching monsoon rain roared in from the northeast, but still not a marine moved. It

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lasted 2 hours. Finally the wan moon reappeared and picked out four men, its light gleaming from their weapons, heading out of the village. The marines opened fire, a grenade exploded, and the leathernecks had one more kill and three wounded Vietcong prisoners. "I hate this goddamned place like I never hated any place I've ever been before," growled a leathery marine sergeant, "but I'll tell you something else: I want to win here more than I ever did in two wars before."

THE GAUNTLET TAKEN

What happens next in the war in Vietnam depends in part on the Communists. Having been halted in midstride, the Vietcong can drop back to the small-unit actions and the sabotage of phase 2, adding perhaps massive terrorism in Saigon to try to bring down the government. It is the kind of war they are best at, but "deconcentrating," as U.S. strategists call it, would be a political retreat that might well affect the morale of their troops and their hold on the peasants. Alternatively, they could go into phase 3 anyway, perhaps even with a mass assault of divisional size on U.S. units in the hope of discrediting the U.S. presence by a major, one-shot victory. But that might well prove suicidal, for the Vietcong have discovered that these days a mass assault all too easily turns into an avalanche of airborne bullets, napalm, and bombs. Or they might simply fade away to lie low. Br'er Rabbit fashion, in the hope that sooner or later the United States would get weary of waiting and go back home.

That would be the unwise course of all. For in deciding to stand in South Vietnam, the United States means just that. "After all, we've kept 250,000 men in Western Europe for 20 years," observes a general. "We can wait too." The United States also means much more. It means to counter the Red revolution with a genuine revolution in health, education, welfare, and self-sufficiency for the Vietnamese that the Communists can hardly be expected to understand. The Communists themselves chose South Vietnam as their test case and springboard to the conquest of all southeast Asia. There are signs that they are already beginning to regret it. The United States has picked up the gauntlet, and it is not only Vietnamese nationhood but all of free Asia that stands to be ultimately strengthened by the extraordinary—and still burgeoning—commitment of the lives and talent and treasure of America in Vietnam.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATION BILL, 1966—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 8370) making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONDALE in the chair). The report will be read for the information of the Senate.

The legislative clerk read the report. (For conference report, see House proceedings of October 20, 1965, pp. 26742-26743, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I shall not report in detail on the conference agreement. It was agreed to unanimously and was signed by the conferees of both Houses.

Mr. President, perhaps I should inject rather humorously that a conference report based on 3 months of conferring ought to be reasonably acceptable when it is signed by all the conferees, which is the case with reference to this report.

The full text of the conference report and the statement of the managers on the part of the House appears in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of October 20, 1965, beginning on page 26742.

At this time I wish to pay my compliments and respects to all of the members of the conference committee. Present in the Chamber is the ranking minority member of the Senate conferees, the distinguished senior Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG] who with the distinguished senior Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT] represented the minority Members of the Senate. The distinguished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the distinguished senior Senator from Arizona and chairman of the full committee [Mr. HAYDEN], the distinguished senior Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER], and I, as chairman of the Agricultural Subcommittee, represented the majority for the Senate conferees.

The conference was long, extending through various days in meetings held since August 10 to October 20. During much of this period several members of the conference committee were occupied by duties in connection with the farm legislation as it passed through various stages to final action in the conference committee.

The conference bill totals \$6,242,929,500. This is \$584,118,700 under the 1965 appropriations, \$471,054,300 under the Senate bill, \$39,704,500 under the revised estimates, and \$525,097,500 over the House bill.

The large reduction by the conference in the total amount recommended by the Senate is largely due to the Senate conferees receding on a part of the Senate amendment of \$926.8 million to appropriate for the full unreimbursed loss incurred by the Commodity Credit Corporation during fiscal year 1964, with which I shall deal later in my statement.

RESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROGRAMS

Perhaps I should discuss in some detail the items for the planning and the construction of agricultural research facilities.

The conference agreement provides appropriations for plans and for construction of several agricultural research facilities. Last year items for research experiment stations were limited in view of the supplemental estimate of \$29 million for pesticides which went to research and extension activities of the Department. The pending conference report includes funds for the construction of all but one of facilities for pesticides which were in the budget for 1966. These

pesticide facilities are as follows: Gainesville, Fla., \$1,840,000; Stoneville, Miss., \$1,564,000; and College Station, Tex., \$2,990,000.

The facility proposed at Beltsville, Md., was passed over without prejudice.

The budget also requested construction funds for some of the cotton research facilities for which the planning funds were appropriated last year. All six of these facilities are included in the conference agreement: They are as follows: College Station, Tex., \$644,000; Mesilla Park, N. Mex., \$92,000; Tempe, Ariz., \$1,150,000; Stoneville, Miss., for two facilities, \$92,000 and \$506,000; and Lubbock, Tex., \$276,000.

In addition, funds for additional facilities were requested in the budget and agreed to in the conference on research facilities at: Durant, Okla., \$500,000, for water pollution laboratory. Georgetown, Del., \$500,000, for a poultry research laboratory. Clay Center, Nebr., \$300,000, of planning funds for the research facilities for the Midwest Animal Research Center.

All of these items were budgeted.

Some of the foregoing facilities were omitted in either version of the bill or reduced, but the amounts I have just stated are the amounts agreed to by the conference committee.

As I stated earlier, last year the committee did not act upon requests for several laboratory projects, but in the processing of the bill this year the Senate recommended planning funds for several facilities for which feasibility reports had been previously submitted to the committee from the Department of Agriculture. The committee felt it was justified in taking this action to consider these several research projects and stations and does not consider it has set a precedent. Earlier, the Secretary of Agriculture had announced the proposed closure at 43 locations including lines of research and small stations at an annual savings of \$5,150,000.

This committee held extensive hearings on each of these projects and made its recommendations several months ago. The other body made almost identical recommendations, but did not go into the matter as extensively as we did in the Senate committee. In the conference the agreement has been reached to continue 21 of these stations and lines of research at an annual rate of \$2,389,900.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I shall be glad to yield. I have not quite come to the point at which I will refer to what the Senator is concerned with. However, I shall be glad to yield to him if his exuberance requires that I yield at this time.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I want to express my appreciation to Senator HOLLAND of Florida, Senator YOUNG of North Dakota and other members of the Appropriation Committee for inclusion of an item of \$225,000 for the planning of a National Grain Marketing Research Laboratory to be located in Manhattan, Kans. The estimated cost of the Laboratory is \$3,385,000.

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Government about the great need that exists for post vocational high school technical and vocational training.

You know, and I know, that the most successful way to eliminate poverty, misery, and disease has been through education.

American democracy rests on the understanding and effective participation of all the people. This is just as true today as it was in the days of our Founding Fathers.

As leaders of governments go, Pueblo leaders are indeed silent people. There is little bombast in a form of government which has been amazingly sufficient and stable these past centuries. However, the soft approach should not be mistaken for softness. Rather it should be interpreted as an enduring attitude of peace, one which might well be emulated by all of us.

Perhaps it was this peaceful attitude which impressed President Abraham Lincoln and prompted him to give belated recognition to the Pueblos. President Lincoln ordered ebony silver-crowned canes, one for each Pueblo, on which were inscribed the year "1863" and his name, "A Lincoln, Pres. U.S.A." These canes were transmitted to the Pueblos as symbols of their sovereignty, extending continuing authority and commission for their popular form of government so long satisfactory in serving their administrative needs.

This great man's faith in your ability to unite for the common good is vindicated today more than ever before. He would be pleased with the preamble to your constitution:

"We, the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, members of the existing all Indian Pueblo Council, by virtue of our sovereign rights as Pueblo Indians and in accordance with our ancient customs and laws, in order to promote justice and encourage the common welfare, to foster the social and economic advancement of all the Pueblo Indians, to preserve and protect our common interests, our inherent rights of self-government, and our rights guaranteed to us by treaties, laws, and the Federal Government of the United States of America, do ordain and adopt this constitution and bylaws for the All-Indian Pueblo Council for the common benefit of all Pueblo Indians."

That is a beautiful statement of a democratic people. Again, I congratulate you on this historic day, and wish you well in your daily efforts to perfect the democratic way of life.

DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, the demonstrations across the country protesting our policy in Vietnam illustrate, it seems to me, the price and sometimes the tortures of freedom itself.

The right of public protest, of petition, of free speech, of organizing and directing marches—assuming no local or Federal laws are broken—involves also the right to be wrong, to be mistaken, and even to be misled. Freedom in our system requires that they be tolerated.

Last week, over 100,000 students and protesters turned out in several cities to wave placards and shout slogans. Perhaps 100,000 "kooks" and nitwits out of nearly 200 million people in this country is a tiny minority. But they can do serious harm. They harm the source of freedom by which their actions are to be tolerated. For example:

They offer an opportunity for Communist and left wing extremists to infiltrate such movements.

There is a real danger that Hanoi and Peiping will misread these demonstrations; that they will hope for disunity in our Government, believe that it exists and thereby prolong the war with mounting casualties.

And lastly, these demonstrations choke off and silence demonstrations of many honest and conscientious citizens who have many serious questions about our Vietnam policy. These responsible people engaged in a responsible debate concerning the welfare of our country should not be associated with such irresponsible protests.

TRIBUTE TO THE LATE CLAUDE SCHECKEL, OFFICIAL REPORTER OF DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, Members of the Congress value and appreciate the very excellent permanent staff assistants who perform the very important jobs which provide the coordination and continuity for what would otherwise be the actions of separate legislators. The House of Representatives and Senate were recently saddened by the death of one of these valued associates, Mr. Claude Scheckel, an official reporter of debates for 20 years.

Mr. Scheckel, who was also the father of a former member of my staff, Mrs. Jeanne Butler, was born March 25, 1892, in Alton, Iowa. In Alton, he grew up with two boys who, while they separated in their early adult lives, ended together in the House of Representatives in later life. One of these boyhood friends was Representative Hoeven, who retired from the House last year. The second was the present distinguished Chaplain of the House of Representatives, Dr. Bernard Braskamp. The third was Mr. Scheckel, who became an official reporter of debates.

Mr. Scheckel left Alton to attend the Kent College of Law in Chicago. He served overseas in World War I and returned to become an assistant state's attorney in Chicago. It was there also that he met and married the lady who became Mrs. Scheckel. He was appointed an official reporter of debates in the House by the late and honored Speaker Sam Rayburn 20 years ago, and served there until his retirement last year. His unfortunate death occurred by drowning while he was on a fishing trip in Canada. He was buried at Arlington Cemetery with military honors. Ironically, considering his affection for the Speaker, his funeral took place on what would have been the 25th anniversary of Mr. Rayburn's service as Speaker of the House, September 16.

We regret the passing of Mr. Scheckel, and I know Members of the Congress join with me in addressing our sympathy to his family and our appreciation for his good and able service to the Congress and to the people of the United States.

TRIBUTE TO JACK VALENTI

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, no one in this country is giving more of his time, his energy, and his imagination to ad-

vancing our national purpose, with less public recognition, than Mr. Jack Valenti, President Johnson's Special Assistant, valued adviser, and confidant.

It has been my personal privilege and pleasure to know Jack Valenti and his lovely wife and family.

I have known many good men during my public career, but I have admired and respected no man more than Jack Valenti.

Our country is very fortunate that Jack Valenti is in the White House as President Johnson's Special Assistant.

Therefore, I was pleased to note in the Washington Post of October 17, a column by the distinguished William S. White entitled "Valenti's Service." That column gave long-overdue credit to Jack Valenti's enormous competence, energy, and devotion to public service.

I ask unanimous consent to have the text of Mr. White's column inserted at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

VALENTI'S SERVICE BRUSHED OFF TOO LONG (By William S. White)

An accumulation of 2 years of fatigue from what is surely the most brutally demanding job in the world is not only delaying—though not really threatening—the complete recovery of President Johnson from his surgical operation.

It is also adding to the already heavy burdens borne by the President's staff people—and to none more than to that extraordinarily able man of all work who is Jack Valenti.

Some men are said to be accident prone; continuously they suffer the small, tiresome mishaps of life. Valenti might be said to be stereotype-ridden, to be pursued by hostile clichés. Though nobody is closer to the President or more nearly indispensable to him, Jack Valenti seems fated to be constantly brushed off with the adjective that patronizes.

His admiration for and devotion to the President are quite open; ergo, he must therefore be servile—a kind of valet.

He is short and compact; ergo, he's described as little or swarthy, and his natural kindness and courtesy are put down as mere efforts by one J. Valenti to ingratiate himself.

He was in prior life an advertising man; ergo, it follows that he must be an insensitive huckster. The fact that he is nothing of the kind but rather is a skillful and perceptive writer and editor of much White House prose—indeed, the ultimate editor short of the President himself—is not mentioned.

His undergraduate degree was awarded by the University of Houston, which tragically has no hallowed halls, no hanging ivy; hence it follows that he is not really and truly an honest-to-God intellectual. The fact that he made up for his disastrous failure to attend the right college by earning a master's degree at good old Harvard itself is not mentioned.

Indeed the story of Jack Valenti would form an excellent case study chapter in any inquest upon one of the phenomena of current politics. This is the power of snobbery within the Democratic Party—precisely the kind of snobbery, by the way, so long directed from within against both Presidents Truman and Johnson.

The self-consciously "in" people make a profession of screeching against the evils of discrimination, but apply the most juvenile prejudices in their estimates of other men.

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Washington. Will there be another one this spring? If so, I hope to attend. Would the State Department be willing to finance my trip to this conference?

Please consider my proposal and inform me of your decision.

Very truly yours,

LYLE E. DEHNING, CPA,
Chairman of International Relations.

PUEBLOS OF NEW MEXICO SIGN NEW CONSTITUTION

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, the distinguished junior Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MONTROYA] was out in his home State last weekend to speak at a uniquely American ceremony.

I am referring to the program at Santo Domingo Pueblo on Saturday, October 16, 1965, near Albuquerque, in which representatives of the self-governing Pueblos in New Mexico met to sign their all-Pueblo constitution.

I know of no man in America who has more at heart the interests of American Indians than does the distinguished junior Senator from New Mexico. Because of his great work in that field, we recently had him out to Oklahoma for the formation of Oklahoma for Indian opportunity, and he made a great speech there.

At the Santo Domingo meeting on October 16, the Pueblos banded together in a federation which is akin to the Federal system of the United States. The all-Pueblo constitution declares that each local Pueblo retains its historic rights of self-government, and at the same time all Pueblo Indians will work together on problems common to all of them.

The junior Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MONTROYA] captured the spirit of this particular occasion very well in his speech. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that his remarks be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech of the junior Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MONTROYA] was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE JOSEPH M. MONTROYA AT THE CONSTITUTION SIGNING CEREMONY OF THE ALL-PUEBLO COUNCIL, SANTO DOMINGO PUEBLO, N. MEX., OCTOBER 16, 1965

Chairman MONTROYA. Ladies and gentlemen, I am honored that you have invited me to join with you for this historic occasion.

It is not often that one has the opportunity to participate in the signing of a constitution for a freedom-loving people. The writing and signing of a constitution is one of the supreme acts which a democratic people can perform, and when the occasion is the signing of a constitution for the first Americans, it is a particularly noteworthy day.

In one sense, however, this new statement of the democratic way of life is but an extension of the long and honored history of the Pueblo peoples. On countless occasions in the past, you have banded together for the common good, and for common protection against the dangers which threatened you from without.

The occasion today represents still another manifestation of the united front which the Pueblo leaders will present for the common good of the Pueblo people. In this light, permit me to touch briefly on certain activities involving the Pueblo Indians as these

activities relate to the Indians themselves and to the State of New Mexico and the Federal Government.

Jurisdictional problems, especially in law enforcement, have in past years caused some feelings of irritation between the various governmental levels within the State, but I must say that vast progress in solving this problem has been made. The Pueblos have made great strides in establishing uniform codes for traffic control, as well as in civil and criminal cases.

The courts and court procedures of the Pueblo of Laguna might well be used as models for many other jurisdictions, Pueblo and State alike.

The past 20 years have seen considerable improvement in relationships between the Pueblo and adjacent communities. This spirit of fellowship displayed between the law enforcement agencies of the different jurisdictions is highly commendable.

I think it is worthy of note that in the past few years the Federal Government has been able to increase its law enforcement assistance to you from a staff made up of one special officer, to its present strength of 10 officers.

Another important sign of progress is the development of your road systems.

Roads are the initial step in the development of any community. This was true when the Romans accomplished their monumental road building projects throughout Europe, and it is true today. The Pueblos of New Mexico have contributed to progress by giving rights-of-way to the State for the building of many of its main arteries. In doing this, the Pueblos have demonstrated a great deal of insight. What is good for the Pueblos is good for the State, and what is good for the State is, likewise, good for the Pueblos.

Reports on range and agriculture and development have also been encouraging. Plans for this year include land rehabilitation and distribution on 335 acres at Isleta and 150 acres at Cochiti, to add to the nearly 5,000 acres which have been rehabilitated to date at the Pueblos in the middle Rio Grande Valley. Concrete ditch lining is planned, also, at San Ildefonso and Taos.

It is apparent from reports reaching my office that Indian livestock men are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of efficient range and herd management to achieve a more profitable livestock business. A major project this year will be emphasis on proper range management in order to be able to provide much needed range water developments.

Last year, a sheepshearing school for Indian trainees was held at Fort Wingate, under the sponsorship of the Manpower Development Training Act. Twenty-six men participated in the training—12 from Laguna and Acoma, 14 from the Navajo peoples. Nearly all of the Laguna-Acoma trainees are utilizing their training, and several have obtained Economic Opportunity Act loans to purchase shearing equipment. The trainees are shearing approximately 100 head of sheep per day at 25 cents per head, each averaging \$25 per day.

Recreation developments, too, promise to usher in a new economic era for the Pueblos. The State of New Mexico and many Federal agencies have long recognized the recreation resources potential of the State, and have emphasized this by giving full support to the construction of the Rio Grande Gorge Bridge. As you know, this bridge will open lines of communication to a potential recreation area that will include the Navajo Dam, the San Juan diversion, and the Cochiti Dam, as well as reservoirs and lakes of lesser size scattered throughout the general land area.

The Indian Pueblos, in preparing their 10-year programs and overall economic development plans, have taken cognizance of

the State's emphasis on recreation development. They are coordinating recreation plans with those of the State. This can be specifically noted on two sizable projects. One is the Cochiti Dam, a Corps of Engineers flood and sedimentation control project that will cost \$58 million. The project by congressional authorization provides for a permanent pool of 1,200 surface acres, with most of the project lying within the boundaries of the Cochiti Indian Reservation, approximately 50 miles north of Albuquerque.

The recreation and tourism area will extend from the Cochiti Dam to State Highway 4, via the beautiful Valle Grande area to Los Alamos, the Santa Clara Canyon and Puye Cliff Dwelling areas on the Santa Clara Reservation, the Bandelier National Monument, and north to the recreation areas being developed by the San Juan diversion project and the Navajo Dam.

In another instance, the Sandia ski area in the Sandia Mountains, approximately 15 miles northeast of Albuquerque, in 1965 contracted for a multimillion-dollar tramway that will traverse the west side of the Sandia Mountains upward to the mountain crest. The tramway access from State Highway 422 is by way of a cooperative Bureau of Indian Affairs and State highway road across Indian land.

The recreation development for all Pueblo reservations, including the Pueblos south and southwest of Albuquerque, varies in size from major development projects such as those mentioned to projects that can expect no more than 10,000 to 15,000 visitations each year. Overall, the improvement in economic condition of most Pueblos and adjacent communities will be substantial. The Pueblos' contribution to developing the recreation potential of the State, now a sleeping giant, is well recognized.

It is gratifying to note that the Pueblo Indians have shared in the funds made available through President Johnson's anti-poverty program. This program has contributed significantly to the economic advancement of the Pueblo Indians.

So far, five community action programs have been approved for our Indian communities. These five programs are offering literacy instruction, job training, and employment counseling. My office has received many inquiries about community action, and I am sure that this phase of the war on poverty, as well as other related programs, has only begun to make itself felt in the pueblos.

I have been informed that many Indian people from pueblos have applied to the Farmers Home Administration for loans to purchase farm equipment, home improvements, acquisition of livestock, and to establish or supplement a small business operation at the reservation community.

These are only samples of the opportunities which exist today for enhancing and improving your way of life, and these are only samples of the ways in which you have made use of your opportunities.

I could go on and on, but we all know what I am talking about.

But I do want to say a special word about education, a subject which has been close to my heart for many years.

You of the pueblos also recognize the importance of education, as evidenced by the number of children you have in school.

The higher education grants provided for Indian children present a unique example of acceptance by the Government of a responsibility to provide the best in education that it possibly can. This is not merely a right of the individual but an obligation of the Government.

I want to take special note of the fact that you as officers of your pueblos have long made representations to the Federal